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I. Introduction and Historical Context

Every student of the law knows that changed circumstances are a ground for
overruling precedents and repealing statutes. For example, Justice Cardozo, in rewriting
product liability law stated, “Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do
not fit the conditions of travel today. The principle that the danger must be imminent does
not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever the needs
of life in a developing civilization require them to be.”3 Similarly, the United States
Supreme Court in the Admiralty context, when rejecting the traditional common law
triple duty standard for owners and occupiers of land, stated:

The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee and
invitee were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a culture
which traced many of its standards to a heritage of feudalism. In an effort
to do justice in an industrialized urban society, with its complex economic
and individual relationships, modern common-law courts have found it
necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal refinements, to create
subclassifications among traditional common-law categories, and to
delineate fine gradations in the standards of care which the landowner
owes to each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications and
subclassifications bred by the common law have produced confusion and
conflict. As new distinctions have been spawned, older ones have become
obscured. Through this semantic morass the common law has moved,
unevenly and with hesitation, towards “imposing on owners and occupiers
a single duty of reasonable care in all circumstances.”4

Sometimes, new laws are necessary because we used to live differently than we
do now. Laws appropriate to feudal times are in apropos in modern civilization. On other
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occasions, our lifestyle has not changed but our beliefs about the world—both its physical
properties and the psychology or biology of humans—have changed. Although this
Article focuses mostly on changes in scientific beliefs, changed circumstances are also
relevant to our main thesis.
We have seen that laws and judicial decisions may, in retrospect, no longer be
useful, or may even prove to have been mistaken when they were created. They are, at
most, based upon some subset of the sum total of information available at the time the
laws and decisions are created. That information itself is always incomplete, and
sometimes mistaken. When knowledge advances, it is wise and necessary to reconsider
legislation, regulation, and common law decisions that were based upon prior views.
This is especially true for laws governing medicine, a field that has changed, and is
continuing to change, rapidly and profoundly as science advances.

A.

Common Law Overrulings and Statutory Changes Resulting from Medical
Advances

Many medical advances have spawned overrulings of traditional doctrine. For
example, since the thirteenth century, there has been a common law principle that
originated in England, stating that an act causing death is not a homicide if the death
occurs more than a year and a day after the act was committed.5 This so-called year and a
day rule has been understood as a substantive principle of criminal law, conclusively
presuming that an injury inflicted more than a year and a day before the victim dies does
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not cause the death, with the result that the injurer is not guilty of homicide.6 However,
with modern technology, it is now possible to keep some brain-damaged individuals alive
for many years after an assault, thus turning the assault into a homicide years later. In
State v. Picotte, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, writing for the Wisconsin supreme
court, stated that one of the traditional justifications for the rule was that the primitive
state of thirteenth-century medical knowledge had made it difficult to establish causation
beyond a reasonable doubt after a great deal of time had elapsed between the injury to the
victim and the victim’s death.7 However, the court continued, “advances in medical
science that permit causes of death to be identified with great certainty have undermined
[this] justification.”8 For these and other reasons, courts in at least a dozen states have
abrogated the year and a day rule as anachronistic, based primarily on advances in
medical science.9 It is likely that most—if not all—jurisdictions that consider the rule in
the future will abrogate it as well.
Similarly, advances in medical science have changed our understanding of death
from primarily cessation of heart, circulatory, and respiratory function to cessation of
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and a day rule was anachronistic. Id.
In North Carolina (State v. Hefler, 299 S.E. 2d 456 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)), the court denied the
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brain and nervous system function. Because killing is causing death, this change is the
basis for the demise of the year and a day rule. The Connecticut supreme court provides a
list of considerations that courts should consider in determining whether advancements in
medical science justify overruling prior common law rules.10 These factors include:11

1) Whether the issue has ever been raised before; in this case, it counts in favor
of seriously considering switching to brain death that this is an issue of first
impression;
2) The valuable quality of common law as active and dynamic, and changing to
meet the needs of a growing society;
3) The absurdity of a prohibition against taking into account new medical
equipment that can more accurately diagnose and determine medical facts;
4) The policy of courts not to ignore change or disregard reality;
5) That reasonable evolving medical standards should play a dominant role in
relevant legal rules in the absence of overriding contrary considerations;
6) The plain meaning doctrine;
7) Plain meaning should be enlarged or narrowed, as appropriate, under changed
circumstances;
8) Statutory construction is not “a ritual to be observed by unimaginative
adherence to well-worn professional phrases,” quoting Justice Frankfurter;12
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9) The doctrine that the common law may look to the policies underlying
statutes.13

Much legislation is passed as a result of changed circumstances. Some of that
legislation is responsive to scientific advances. For example, many states have adopted
legislation redefining death as cessation of brain function.14

B.

Medical Advances and Legal Theory

There are two major kinds of theories of law, natural law and legal positivism.
Natural law asserts the existence of some necessary or constitutive relationship between
law and critical morality, that is, moral propositions whose truth is independent of the
beliefs of society or its conventions: some would call it absolute morality. By contrast,
legal positivism maintains that there is no necessary connection between law and
morality; any connection is merely contingent. Law is a matter of social fact.
We will briefly describe how changed circumstances, especially scientific
advances, are dealt with by one of each kind of theory. Michael Moore, a natural law
theorist, urges that the term ‘death’ is a natural kind term, like ‘cow,’ ‘lithium,’ or ‘gold.’
By contrast, ‘pencil’ and ‘store’ are not natural kinds but artificial constructs whose
meaning depends upon human purpose and usages. One major theory of the reference,
semantics, or meaning of such terms is that their meaning is determined by scientific
investigation. Moore accepts this theory of language in general and applies it to legal
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language in particular. Cows, lithium, and gold are whatever science discovers them to
be.15 Thus, cows are whatever are four-legged mammals with udders, that moo, and so
on. Similarly, lithium is the lightest metal, with atomic number 3, a melting point of
180.5 degrees centigrade, and a boiling point of 1342 degrees centigrade. It is a
monovalent cation that belongs to the group of alkali metals together with sodium,
potassium and other elements with which it shares some of its properties. Lithium can
replace sodium in extracellular fluid and during the process of depolarization it has an
extremely rapid intracellular influx and so on.
The reference of the term ‘death’ in particular is one that it is the job of science,
especially medical science, to discover. Moore therefore supports the movement by
courts to overturn common law definitions of death as cessation of heart, lung,
circulatory functions, and consciousness by cessation of brain function when scientists
tell us that cessation of brain function is a more accurate definition of death.16
The legal positivist Melvin Eisenberg develops his theory of law as a coherent
reconstruction of social morality, policy, and experiential propositions.17 Experiential
propositions are propositions “about the way world works.”18 Among experiential
propositions that play a role in adjudication are “the laws of the physical and biological
sciences.”19 Experiential propositions, including especially laws of psychology, mediate
between policies, principles and doctrinal rules.20 Eisenberg is careful to note that courts
can make mistakes about scientific and other propositions about the world. When other
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courts and the larger discourse about such propositions raise questions about their
validity, courts must pull back and either revise the rule or explain why the criticism is
not founded. One source of such criticism is law review articles.21 It is our purpose in
writing this Article to stimulate courts into reconsidering doctrine that is based upon
beliefs about mental illness that are now outdated.

C.

A Brief Historical Context of Mental Health Law

This Article describes advances in our scientific understanding of severe
psychiatric disorders and evaluates the implications of these advances for laws governing
involuntary hospitalization and treatment. Civil commitment, a more familiar term for
involuntary hospitalization, is perhaps the most controversial area of mental health law.
This Article illuminates this area by analyzing the underlying medical facts, legal
policies, and moral principles. As such, it throws light on an area of law that has been,
and continues to be, controversial.
Beginning in the 1960s, virtually all states undertook major changes in their
mental health laws. These changes have had a profound effect on the practice of
psychiatry and on psychiatric services. For example, in 1955, there were 559,000
individuals hospitalized in state psychiatric hospitals in the United States. Based on the
increase in the general population since that time, if a comparable per population number
of individuals were similarly hospitalized today, they would number approximately one
million. In fact, there are fewer than 50,000 individuals so hospitalized, meaning that
95% of individuals who would have been hospitalized fifty years ago have been
________________________________________________________________________
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effectively deinstitutionalized.22 Changes in state mental health laws and judicial
decisions beginning in the late 1960s played a major role in promoting this
deinstitutionalization.
It is generally accepted that the outcome of deinstitutionalization has not been as
favorable as had been originally hoped. Many would say that it has been a dismal failure.
The number of homeless individuals with severe psychiatric disorders has risen steadily
in recent decades, and they now constitute at least one-third of all homeless individuals.23
A relationship between deinstitutionalization and homelessness has been clearly
established.24 Hallucinating men and women are now standard urban fixtures on the
sidewalks of American cities and mid-sized towns.
The number of severely psychiatrically ill individuals in America’s jails and
prison has also risen steadily, with estimates of their total ranging from 7% to 16% of all
those incarcerated.25 The majority of these individuals have been charged with
misdemeanor crimes, often directly related to behavior attributable to their psychiatric
disorder. Often, individuals discharged from state psychiatric hospitals end up in jail
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E. Fuller Torrey, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS
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a review.
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would suggest that approximately 320,000 of them have a severe psychiatric disorder. See Paula M. Ditton,
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within months of being discharged.26 It has also been alleged that individuals with severe
psychiatric disorders, especially those who are not receiving treatment, are responsible
for an increasing number of violent acts, including homicides.27

D.

A Brief Description of Parts II–VI

Part II of this Article describes scientific advances in understanding severe
psychiatric disorders that have occurred since 1975. Severe psychiatric disorders
primarily include the diagnoses of schizophrenia, bipolar (manic-depressive) disorder,
and major depression with or without psychotic features. We focus on schizophrenia,
rather than discussing all severe mental illnesses, in order to keep the presentation to a
manageable length.
Part III describes recent advances in understanding anosognosia and its
application to severe psychiatric disorders. Although anosognosia is one aspect of the
broader scientific advances described in Part II, because of its importance, it is crucial for
understanding mental health laws and thus deserves its own section.

________________________________________________________________________
26
For example, a study of patients discharged from Ohio’s Columbus State Hospital reported that
32% of those diagnosed with schizophrenia had been arrested and jailed within six months. These
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185 (1988).
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illness, not including drug or alcohol abuse, were responsible for 4.3% of all homicides in the United
States; see John M. Dawson and Patrick A. Langan, MURDER IN FAMILIES, Bureau of Statistics Special
Report, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (1988). A study
published by the National Institute of Mental Health reported that “the SPMI (severe and persistently
mentally ill) population without substance(abuse)-related disorders may be responsible for no more than
about 3 percent of violent crime, with 3 to 5 times as much violence accounted for by the dually diagnosed
(SPMI and substance disorders) population.” See Henrick Harwood et al., THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF
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Parts IV and V analyze two of the most important state mental health laws that
were changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s: the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, enacted
in California in 1969, and the Lessard v. Schmidt decision, handed down by a three-judge
District Court in Wisconsin in 1972. In both instances, the assumptions made at the time
the laws were changed regarding the nature of severe psychiatric disorders and the
competence of individuals to make informed treatment decisions are now known to be
erroneous.
Part VI then examines the legal implications of current scientific knowledge for
the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and the Lessard decision as representative examples of
state mental health laws. The implications can perhaps best be summarized in the words
of Bertolt Brecht: “Intelligence is not to make no mistakes / But quickly to see how to
make them good.”28

II. Understanding the Causes of Schizophrenia

A.

Before 1975: A Scientific Muddle

During the 1960s and early 1970s, when state laws governing involuntary
commitment and treatment of psychiatric patients were undergoing revision in many
states, the causes of schizophrenia were essentially unknown. There was, in fact,
controversy regarding whether schizophrenia was even a disease entity. The American
Handbook of Psychiatry, published in 1959, was probably the most influential psychiatric
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textbook of the 1960s. Its two chapters on schizophrenia approvingly quoted Thomas
Szasz’s early writings: “The problem of schizophrenia which many consider to be the
core problem of psychiatry today. . . . To put it simply: there is no such problem.”29 This
was written even prior to Szasz’s 1961 book The Myth of Mental Illness, which widely
popularized the idea that schizophrenia did not exist.
Insofar as schizophrenia did exist, the American Handbook of Psychiatry leaned
heavily toward psychoanalytic explanations that were fashionable at that time. The
textbook defined schizophrenia as “a specific reaction to an extreme state of anxiety,
originated in childhood and reactivated later in life by psychological factors,”30 and it
devoted 75% of the two chapters on schizophrenia to various psychoanalytic
explanations. Specifically, the textbook claimed: “Psychodynamic studies reveal that the
road leading to schizophrenia had its beginning in the remote past of the patient, perhaps
shortly after his birth.”31
In addition to psychoanalytic explanations for the cause of schizophrenia,
psychiatric textbooks of this era also focused on the family, and specifically mothers, as
________________________________________________________________________
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Silvano Arieti, Schizophrenia: Other Aspects; Psychotherapy, (hereinafter ARIETI,
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1970s. For example, Bruce Ennis, who has been called “the ‘father’ of the mental health bar” and who
subsequently became chairman of the American Bar Association’s Commission on the Mentally Disabled,
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Armat, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 109–
110 (1990). When Ennis published his influential PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY in 1972, Szasz contributed a
preface.
30
ARIETI, AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, VOL. 1, 501.
31
Silvano Arieti, Schizophrenia: The Manifest Symptomatology, the Psychodynamic and Formal
Mechanisms (hereinafter ARIETI, SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE MANIFEST SYMPTOMATOLOGY), in ARIETI,
AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, VOL. 1, 468.
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the cause of the disorder. The American Handbook of Psychiatry, for example,
prominently featured the theories of Theodore Lidz and his colleagues at Yale University,
who had studied families with one member affected with schizophrenia. It summarized
these theories as follows:

Many authorities consider the mother the main dynamic factor in the
genesis of the child’s future psychiatric condition, and have devised the
classification ‘schizophrenogenic mother.’ She has been described in
many ways: overprotective, hostile, overtly or subtly rejecting,
overanxious, cold, and distant etc. In many cases she is found definitely
unfit for motherhood.32

Szaszian, psychoanalytic, and family interaction theories continued to dominate
professional thinking about the causes of schizophrenia throughout the 1960s and early
1970s, as measured by two other leading textbooks of psychiatry. The Theory and
Practice of Psychiatry was published in 1966, and Modern Synopsis of Comprehensive
Textbook of Psychiatry in 197233; one book or the other was used by virtually every
trainee in psychiatry, psychology, and psychiatric social work of that period.
In its chapter on schizophrenia, The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry picked up
the Szaszian theme widely circulating at that time and asked: “Is it [schizophrenia] a
disease? A maladjustment? A way of life?” Regarding possible causes of schizophrenia,
the textbook acknowledged that “no satisfactory general etiological explanation exists at
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ARIETI, SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE MANIFEST SYMPTOMATOLOGY, 469. Although such theories sound
outlandish today, in the 1960s they were considered to be mainstream and were accepted by the majority of
psychiatrists.
33
Frederick C. Redlich & Daniel X. Freedman, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY (1966)
(hereinafter REDLICH & FREEDMAN, THEORY AND PRACTICE) and Alfred M. Freedman et al., MODERN
SYNOPSIS OF COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (1972) (hereinafter FREEDMAN ET AL., MODERN
SYNOPSIS).
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present. . . . [O]ur knowledge represents more of a speculative game than an opportunity
to assess an array of well-verified facts. . . . In a word, we are still groping in darkness.”34
In discussing possible theories regarding the cause of schizophrenia, The Theory
and Practice of Psychiatry devoted the majority of its discussion to psychoanalytic and
family interaction theorists. Regarding the former, the textbook noted that psychoanalytic
investigators assumed that factors predisposing to schizophrenia could be found in
traumatic events in early childhood and that most utterances and behavior of individuals
with schizophrenia are psychologically meaningful and represent repressed wishes of the
individual.35
Family interaction theories of schizophrenia were also given prominence in
The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry. The 1950s research of Theodore Lidz, cited in
The American Handbook of Psychiatry, had been supplemented by the mid-1960s by the
studies of several other researchers, especially Don D. Jackson and Gregory Bateson in
California. Jackson and Bateson attributed the cause of schizophrenia to faulty
communications between parent (especially mother) and child, which they claimed
produced confusion and ultimately the symptoms of schizophrenia in the developing
child.36 These family theories were prominently cited by individuals who were trying to
change state mental health laws, as will be discussed in section IV.

________________________________________________________________________
34

REDLICH & FREEDMAN, THEORY AND PRACTICE 459, 506, 486–87.
REDLICH & FREEDMAN, THEORY AND PRACTICE 500. As an example, the textbook cites the
following: “A schizophrenic patient fell from a third-story window when he tried to launch a contraption
that would permit him to fly to the sun. Like his famous model, Icarus, he failed. Is the patient’s behavior
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believe it is.” (496)
36
Specifically, Jackson and Bateson claimed that parents may produce schizophrenia in a child by
using communications that put the child in a “double-bind.” An example cited by The Theory and Practice
of Psychiatry is as follows: “A mother gives her son two neckties for Christmas and when the boy appears
wearing one, she asks disapprovingly, ‘Didn’t you like the other one?’ Here the boy cannot in sanity wear
35
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Modern Synopsis of Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, published in 1972,
enumerated seven possible causal explanations of schizophrenia. Three of the six theories
attributed schizophrenia to stress, another to “severe psychological trauma” early in life,
another to “family environment and its interacting members,” and the last to a mix of all
of these.37 Overall in this textbook, two-thirds of the discussion on possible causes of
schizophrenia focused on psychological causes. Family interaction theories were
especially prominent and emphasized “the concept that the patient is a symptom of the
family pathology and that serious mental disturbances are causally related to mental
disease or psychopathology in parents.”38
Prior to 1975, possible biological causes of schizophrenia were also considered
but not given prominence in textbooks of psychiatry. For example, the American
Handbook of Psychiatry devoted 25% of its two chapters on schizophrenia to biological
theories but largely relegated them to the past. “An enormous number of studies have
been made in an attempt to determine the organic changes that cause, accompany, or are
the result of schizophrenia. Their findings are not consistent, their interpretation
controversial.”39 Specifically discussed were genetic studies, “constitutional factors,” “the
endocrine glands,” biochemical changes, and neuropathology. The biochemical
investigations were said to be “almost entirely negative” and neuropathological studies of
the brain to have “not revealed anything more definite than have the other organs.”40

both, and if he wears either or none he will displease his mother.” (REDLICH & FREEDMAN, THEORY AND
PRACTICE 503).
37
FREEDMAN ET AL., MODERN SYNOPSIS 222.
38
FREEDMAN ET AL., MODERN SYNOPSIS 224.
39
ARIETI, SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE MANIFEST SYMPTOMATOLOGY, 485.
40
ARIETI, SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE MANIFEST SYMPTOMATOLOGY, 487, 488.
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In fact, if one examines early biological studies of schizophrenia with the benefit
of hindsight, they anticipate successful biological studies that have been carried out since
1975. Studies of brain structure were done by pneumoencephalography, which involved
injecting air into the brain’s fluid-filled spaces (cerebral ventricles) and then taking Xrays. Five studies of individuals with schizophrenia were carried out prior to the
introduction of antipsychotic medications; all showed enlargement of the cerebral
ventricles in the patients,41 a finding that has been replicated many times in more recent
studies.
Another common method for measuring biological abnormalities in individuals
with schizophrenia in these early studies was done by electroencephalogram [EEG]
Between 1941 and 1955, five controlled EEG studies of never-medicated patients with
schizophrenia were carried out; all five reported that approximately twice as many
patients as normal controls had abnormal EEGs.42 This is consistent with findings in
recent studies.
A variety of neurological abnormalities were also described in patients with
schizophrenia prior to the introduction of antipsychotic medication. Abnormal
involuntary movements called dyskinesias were widely observed more than a century
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PSYCHOSEN (1957).
42
K.H. Finley & C.M. Campbell, Electroencephalography in Schizophrenia, 98 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
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ago. A review of the clinical records of over 600 patients in an English asylum between
1850 and 1890, for example, found descriptions of dyskinesias for almost one-third of the
patients.43 Similarly, rigidity, tremor, and a slowing of physical movements were
frequently described in the early years of the twentieth century as neurological signs of
schizophrenia.44 Studies were also done on individuals with schizophrenia, demonstrating
abnormalities in vestibular reactivity, which is the brain’s mechanism that controls the
person’s sense of motion.45
In summary, in the United States prior to 1975, our understanding of the causes of
schizophrenia was a muddle. One group of psychiatric professionals denied that the
disease even existed. Among those who believed schizophrenia did exist, the majority
believed that it was caused by traumatic experiences in early childhood and/or by faulty
parenting and communications. A minority of psychiatric professionals believed that
schizophrenia was a biological disease of the brain, but this theory was widely considered
to be a relic of the past. Anyone who was considering changing mental health laws at that
time would have been likely to conclude, after examining the existing professional
literature, that the best scientific view was that schizophrenia was a psychological
condition brought about by early childhood experiences and maladaptive parenting, not
an organic disease of the brain. As we demonstrate in sections IV and V, that is what
happened.
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B.

Since 1975: A Biological Disease

Our understanding of the causes of schizophrenia has changed profoundly since
1975. Prior to that time, researchers were “groping in the darkness,” in the words of one
psychiatric textbook. Since 1975, literally hundreds of studies have been carried out
proving beyond any reasonable doubt that schizophrenia is a disease of the brain.
Although the precise cause of the disease is still being elucidated, among professionals,
the consensus is virtually unanimous that schizophrenia is a brain disease. In this respect,
schizophrenia is now thought to be similar to Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease,
multiple sclerosis, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and other disorders that are known to be
diseases of the brain but whose precise causes are not yet known.
One way to compare pre-1975 views of psychiatry with contemporary views is by
comparing standard textbooks of psychiatry. For example, the 7th edition of the
Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, published in 2000, is a direct descendent of the
first edition, published in 1972, as discussed above. In the 1972 edition, prior to the
recent studies, 75% of the discussion of the causes of schizophrenia was allotted to
psychological causes and 25% to biological causes. Moreover, most of the discussion of
psychological theories of schizophrenia is from a historical point of view. In the 2000
edition, only 10% of the discussion of the causes of schizophrenia is allotted to
psychological causes, with the remaining 90% allotted to biological causes.46 Moreover,
in theAmerican Psychia tric Press Textbook of Psychiatry, published in 1999, “social and
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family factors” regarding the causes of schizophrenia occupy only 6% of the text on this
subject, while biological factors are discussed in the remaining 94%.47 These textbooks
reflect the important change in our understanding of schizophrenia that has taken place
since 1975.
The remainder of this section will summarize studies that lead to the conclusion
that schizophrenia has biological roots and is a disease of the brain. We will restrict the
discussion to studies that have been carried out on individuals who had never been treated
with antipsychotic medication; such individuals are frequently referred to as “neuroleptic
naïve.” There are two reasons for confining discussion to this group. First, antipsychotic
medications themselves may also bring about biological changes in the brain; in fact, that
is why such medications are effective in treating the symptoms of schizophrenia. Thus, by
restricting the analysis to untreated patients, it becomes clear that whatever abnormalities
are found are a consequence of the schizophrenia disease process and not due to
medications. Second, some authors who oppose psychiatry have argued that
schizophrenia is a consequence of medication, not a naturally occurring phenomenon.
They have therefore concluded that modern psychiatric medications do more harm than
good.48
Studies of individuals with schizophrenia who had never been treated with
antipsychotic medications at the time the studies were done can be divided into structural
abnormalities, neurological abnormalities, neuropsychological abnormalities,
neurophysiological abnormalities, and cerebral metabolic abnormalities.
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1. Structural Abnormalities
The modern era in schizophrenia research can be dated to 1976 with the
publication of the first research using the newly developed computerized axial
tomography (CT) brain scans, which showed that the brains of individuals with
schizophrenia have significantly larger fluid-filled spaces (cerebral ventricles) compared
to normal controls. The CT scan was the first technology allowing for visualization of
brain structures in living patients that could be used to statistically distinguish those with
schizophrenia from normal controls.49 Following the introduction of CT scans, magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) scans have also become widely available for studying brain
structures.
Since 1976, a total of thirty-three studies of brain structure have been done on
individuals with schizophrenia who had never been medicated.50 All six studies that
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measured the size of the brain ventricles found them to be significantly enlarged. For
example, Gur et al. reported a 16% increase in ventricular volume in thirty-three nevertreated patients compared to sixty-five normal controls. Similarly, McCreadie et al.
reported a 20% increase in ventricular volume in forty-two patients compared to thirtyone normal controls. In addition to ventricular size, abnormalities in brain structure in
never-treated individuals with schizophrenia have been reported for the frontal cortex,
temporal cortex, hippocampus, amygdala, cingulate, thalamus, cerebellum, corpus
callosum, and septum pellucidum. The only brain area that has been extensively studied
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and for which the results of different studies have been contradictory is the basal ganglia,
especially its caudate subdivision.

2. Neurological Abnormalities
Since 1976, at least thirty-three studies have reported significantly more
neurological abnormalities in individuals with schizophrenia who had never been treated
with antipsychotic medications compared to unaffected controls. The neurological
abnormalities include abnormal spontaneous movements called dyskinesias, parkinsonian
signs, neurological soft signs, and cerebellar signs.
Dyskinesias are spontaneous movements, usually involving the tongue, facial
muscles, or arms. Eleven studies have demonstrated that such movements occur more
often among never-treated individuals with schizophrenia than among normal controls.51
For example, Fenton et al. found that 23% of never-treated patients exhibited some form
of spontaneous dyskinesia. Seven recent studies have also reported that never-treated
patients with schizophrenia have neurological abnormalities resembling those seen in
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Parkinson’s disease, including rigidity, tremor, and slowing of movements.52 Combining
the studies, 91 out of 394 (23%) never-treated patients showed parkinsonian signs.
Neurological abnormalities called soft signs have also been extensively
investigated in individuals with schizophrenia. Soft signs include such things as being
unable to identify the type of coin placed in the hand without looking at it. Since 1992,
fourteen research groups have assessed the presence of neurological soft signs in nevermedicated patients with schizophrenia.53 Finally, a recent study compared neurological
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signs of cerebellar dysfunction in 155 never-treated individuals with schizophrenia to 155
matched normal controls. Among the patients, 21% had signs of cerebellar dysfunction,
such as having an abnormal gait, whereas only 5% of the normal controls had such
abnormalities.54

3. Neuropsychological Abnormalities
For almost two centuries, it has been observed that individuals with schizophrenia
have deficits in some neuropsychological functions, especially memory, attention, and
planning (also called executive function). Since 1994, eight studies have been carried out
on patients who had never received antipsychotic medications confirming these
observations. For example, Brickman et al. compared twenty-nine never-medicated
adolescents with schizophrenia to seventeen matched normal controls and reported that
the patient group performed significantly worse than the normal controls, especially on
memory, attention, and executive functioning.55 In addition to these eight studies, three
other research groups studied individuals with first-episode schizophrenia, some of whom
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Two-Year Follow-Up (abstract), 51 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 118S (2002); and J.G. Kerns et al., ContextProcessing Deficits and Decreased Prefrontal Cortex Activity: Specific Associations with Unmedicated,
First-Episode Schizophrenia and with Disorganization Symptoms (abstract), 60 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 225
(2003); S.K. Hill et al. Impairment of Verbal Memory and Learning in Antipsychotic-Naïve Patients with
First-Episode Schizophrenia, 68 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 127–36 (2004); K.P. Good et al., The Relationship of
Neuropsychological Test Performance with the PANSS in Antipsychotic Naïve, First-Episode Psychosis
Patients, 68 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 11–19 (2004).

25

had never been medicated and some of whom had been briefly medicated, and reported
that the never-medicated patients had significant neuropsychological deficits.56

4. Neurophysiological Abnormalities
Electrical impulses are one method used to communicate between brain cells. As
noted previously, electroencephalograms (EEGs) have been used for many years to assess
brain function in schizophrenia. Consistent with past studies, two recent studies used
EEGs to examine sleep patterns in never-medicated individuals with schizophrenia, and
both reported more abnormalities in the patients compared to the normal controls.57
Another technique commonly used in psychiatric research to measure
neurophysiological function is a type of electrical impulse called an evoked potential,
elicited by auditory, visual, or sensory input. For example, a startle reflex, measured
electrically, may be evoked by a loud sound. Three recent studies of evoked potentials
have been carried out on never-medicated individuals with schizophrenia; all three
showed significantly more abnormalities in the patients than in normal controls.58
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Another measure of neurophysiological brain function is the recently developed
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), in which the brain is stimulated using magnets.
A study of twenty-one neuroleptic-naïve individuals with schizophrenia reported them to
be significantly different from twenty-one normal controls on some TMS measures.59
These studies suggest abnormal electrical and magnetic circuits in the brains of
individuals with schizophrenia, evidence of neurophysiological dysfunction.

5. Cerebral Metabolic Abnormalities
The measurement of cerebral metabolic activity is comparatively new and
technically complex. Three ways of doing this are by positron emission tomography
(PET), single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). Since it is known that antipsychotic medications can affect
these tests,60 it is important to use individuals who have not been treated whenever
possible.
Since 1991, twenty studies have examined cerebral metabolic abnormalities in
individuals with schizophrenia never treated with antipsychotic medications.
Representative of these studies is one by Braus et al., in which twelve never-medicated
patients with schizophrenia were compared to eleven normal controls by functional MRI.
According to the researchers: “In comparison with control subjects, patients showed
and two others who had been off all medication for more than six months. It showed that antipsychotic
medication improves neurophysiological function, as measured by the acoustic startle reflex; see Almut I.
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Patients, 47 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 61–70 (2000); M. Valkonen-Korhonen, Altered Auditory Processing in
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(2003).
59
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60
R.T. Loeber et al., Cerebellar Blood Volume in Bipolar Patients Correlates with Medication, 51
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reduced activation in the right thalamus, the right prefrontal cortex, and the parietal lobe
. . . bilaterally.”61 Of the twenty studies reported to date, all except one found more
cerebral metabolic abnormalities in the individuals with schizophrenia compared to the
controls.
In summary, since 1975 at least 103 separate studies have demonstrated that
individuals with schizophrenia, who have never been treated with antipsychotic
medications, have significant abnormalities in brain structure and function. This listing of
studies includes only those related to brain abnormalities; additional studies have been
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carried out on antipsychotic-naïve patients with schizophrenia that have demonstrated
other types of abnormalities such as altered interleukins, nerve growth factor, and red
blood cell membrane essential fatty acids.62 Studies of medication-naïve patients thus
demonstrate that abnormalities in schizophrenia are part of the disease process, not a
result of medication being taken to treat the disease.
For neurological, neuropsychological, and neurophysiological abnormalities of
cerebral function, in fact, there is evidence suggesting that antipsychotic medications
decrease the abnormalities and return the brain to more normal function. This is
consistent with the known effectiveness of antipsychotic medications in reducing the
clinical symptoms of schizophrenia.
The 103 studies cited, which were restricted to those in which the patients had not
previously taken antipsychotic medication, are part of a much larger cohort of studies of
cerebral structure and function in patients who had been medicated. Studies of neurologic
soft signs in schizophrenia, for example, number over 50, and studies of
neuropsychological abnormalities number well over 200.63 Altogether, there are now over
1,000 published studies on brain structure and function in individuals with schizophrenia.
It should also be emphasized that none of the cerebral abnormalities cited above
are specific to schizophrenia. All of them can be found in some other brain diseases and
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occasionally in normal individuals, although they occur statistically more frequently in
individuals with schizophrenia. Thus, the brain abnormalities found in schizophrenia are
similar to the tremor seen in many patients with Parkinson’s disease. Tremor may also be
found in other brain diseases; it occurs in some normal individuals [benign intention
tremor], but it occurs statistically much more frequently in Parkinson’s disease.

III. Anosognosia: Competence To Make Informed Treatment Decisions

Advances in the understanding of anosognosia in recent years have profound
implications for mental health laws. Anosognosia remains, however, little known and
poorly understood, both by the legislators who make the laws and by the law enforcement
officials and judges who implement them. Indeed, only recently a small number of
mental health law scholars became aware of the phenomenon.64 In Descartes’ Error,
neurologist Antonio Damasio called anosognosia “one of the most eccentric
neuropsychological presentations one is likely to encounter.”65 Neurologist Oliver Sacks
in The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat described anosognosia as being “singularly
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difficult, for even the most sensitive observer, to picture the inner state … for this is
unimaginably remote from anything he himself has ever known.”66
Etymologically, anosognosia is derived from the Greek nosos, “disease,” and
gnosis, “knowledge.” It literally means to not know a disease. As commonly used, it
means to not know one’s own disease and is used interchangeably with such terms as
“lack of awareness of illness” and “lack of insight.” In psychiatry, anosognosia usually
connotes three overlapping dimensions: the failure to recognize that one has a psychiatric
disease; the inability to recognize that one’s unusual mental events, such as delusions and
hallucinations are pathological; and noncompliance with treatment.67 Anosognosia is a
biologically based inability to appreciate one’s own illness. Thus, it differs from denial,
which is a psychologically based mechanism we all commonly use. In some individuals
with brain disorders, anosognosia and denial may both be operant.

A.

Before 1975: Confined to Neurology

Anosognosia has been known to neurologists for over a century. In 1893, Gabriel
Anton in Germany published a paper describing a patient who had become paralyzed on
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his side from a stroke but who claimed that there was nothing wrong.68 Additional cases
were reported, and in 1914 Joseph Babinski, at a meeting of the French Neurological
Society, coined the term “anosognosia” to describe this curious syndrome.69
By mid-century, anosognosia had become well established in the neurological
literature and was usually associated with strokes or brain tumors. A 1952 review of one
hundred cases of stroke reported that twenty-three of them had complete anosognosia and
five others “fluctuated in their responses from awareness to total denial.”70 As examples
of anosognosia, the authors cited:

One patient, when asked why she could not move her hand, said,
“Somebody has a hold of it….” One woman when asked whether she
could walk said, “I could walk at home, but not here. It’s slippery here.”
One patient, when asked if anything was wrong with his arm, said, “It’s
just a little stiff—from the cold or something.” When asked why he
couldn’t raise it, he said, “I have a shirt on.”71

In 1955, a neurological monograph described fifty-two additional cases of complete
anosognosia. Included were examples such as the following:

The patient denied there was anything the matter with her left arm or leg.
When asked to raise her left arm, she repeatedly raised her left leg. When
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this error was pointed out to her, she said, “Oh, some people call it an
arm, some a leg. What’s the difference!”72

In some cases of stroke-associated anosognosia, the anosognosia remits as the person’s
stroke resolves and the patient can then acknowledge the problem, but in many cases the
person’s anosognosia is permanent.
One of the most striking aspects of these cases of anosognosia is the absence of
concern in the person affected. As Damasio describes it: “The lack of update on the real
states of body and person is nothing less than astounding … [including] the lack of
concern they show for their overall situation, the lack of emotion they exhibit, the lack of
feeling they report when questioned about it.”73
In contrast to neurology, prior to 1975 there was almost no discussion of
anosognosia among individuals with psychiatric disorders. There had been observations
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that individuals with what was then called
“insanity” were often unaware of their own illness, but connection to the neurologists’
concept of anosognosia was not made. For example, in 1869, an article in the American
Law Review noted: “Generally, insane people do not regard themselves as insane and,
consequently, can see no reason for their confinement other than the malevolent designs
of those who have deprived them of their liberty.”74 Some psychiatrists of that period
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even suggested that lack of awareness of one’s insanity should be the central criterion for
the form of insanity then labeled “moral insanity.”75 It was an echo of Thomas Dekker’s
1604 play The Honest Whore, in which a character declaims: “That proves you mad
because you know it not.”76
By the early twentieth century, psychiatrists occasionally noted lack of insight in
psychiatric patients. Emil Kraepelin, for example, in his classic 1919 textbook observed
that “understanding of the disease disappears fairly rapidly as the malady progresses in
the overwhelming majority of cases, even where in the beginning it was more or less
clearly present.”77
At the time Kraepelin published his textbook, the writings of Sigmund Freud were
already circulating in Europe and the United States. Freud taught that denial was one of
the most common and important defense mechanisms used by people. As Freud’s
theories became more widely known, the concept of denial became increasingly
influential and was invoked to explain why individuals with schizophrenia and other
severe psychiatric disorders did not acknowledge their illnesses. Denial as a
psychologically-based defense mechanism continued to be a prominent psychiatric
explanatory principle throughout the twentieth century. Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s,
when laws governing the treatment of psychiatric patients were undergoing changes,
there was no discussion regarding the possibility that unawareness of one’s illness might
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be a biologically-based symptom of the illness. The concept of anosognosia simply did
not exist in the corpus of psychiatric writings.

B.

Since 1975: Established in Psychiatry

Since the mid- 1970s, there has been a marked increase in interest in, and
understanding of, anosognosia. This increase can be measured by the number of articles
written about anosognosia, as determined by a search of the National Library of
Medicine’s database.78 Between 1970 and 1979, 12 articles about anosognosia were
published; from 1980 to 1989, 50 additional articles were published; and between 1990
and 1999, the number was 119. This increased interest is reflected in both neurology and
psychiatry.

1. Alzheimer’s Disease and Huntington’s Disease
In the 1980s, neurologists extended their interest in anosognosia from strokes and
brain tumors to Alzheimer’s disease and Huntington’s disease. In Alzheimer’s disease,
studies showed that patients in the earliest stages of the disease are aware of, and
increasingly anxious about, their memory problems. Once beyond the early stages,
however, most individuals with Alzheimer’s diseases become less anxious and gradually
lose awareness of their deficits.79 Recent studies have also reported that anosognosia is
most common in Alzheimer’s patients who have the most severe cognitive impairments
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and deficits in activities of daily living, although not all studies have found a linear
relationship.80 Several researchers have noted that individuals with Alzheimer’s disease
may have almost total anosognosia for their cognitive deficits, such as memory loss, and
yet, at the same time, retain awareness for other aspects of function, such as their
behavior.81 The fact that individuals can be completely unaware of some aspects of their
brain function yet aware of other aspects is often confusing to family members and other
observers.
Huntington’s disease is another neurological illness in which anosognosia is
found, especially in the later stages of the disease. Huntington’s disease is genetically
transmitted and includes abnormal movements and severe memory impairment. One
study of thirty patients with Huntington’s disease reported that seven of them had
complete, and four others partial, anosognosia.82 Especially striking in Huntington’s
disease is the possibility that anosognosia may occur for both the person’s memory
impairment and also for their abnormal movements. Thus, one patient was described as
follows:

He fidgeted, sat about, got up, sat about some more and was
euphoric. When I asked about his ability to perform certain
movements, he said he was fine and walked over to the bookcase,
picked up a book and threw it into the air and let it crash to the
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deck. This event did not worry him; he just said it was a
mistake.83

It is important to note that not all neurological diseases are accompanied by
anosognosia. Most patients with Parkinson’s disease, for example, retain relatively good
comprehension of their illness. One study compared thirty-three patients with
Alzheimer’s disease with thirty-three patients with Parkinson’s disease on awareness of
illness, and the patients with Parkinson’s disease had almost no anosognosia.84

2. Schizophrenia
The concept of anosognosia was not clearly linked to schizophrenia until the
1980s. Joseph McEvoy, a psychiatrist at the University of Pittsburgh, began investigating
the link between lack of awareness of illness and the need for involuntary treatment in
individuals with schizophrenia. McEvoy and his associates developed a scale, the Insight
and Treatment Attitudes Questionnaire (ITAQ), to measure awareness of illness and
noted that “committed patients require coercive hospitalization because they fail to
recognize their need for care.”85
In the early 1990s, anosognosia rapidly ascended to prominence in psychiatric
writings. Xavier Amador, a psychologist at Columbia University in New York, and
Anthony David, a psychiatrist at the Institute of Psychiatry in London, began studies with
their colleagues that have continued to the present. Both groups developed assessment
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tools that can be used to measure awareness of illness: the Scale to Assess Unawareness
of Mental Illness (SUMD) and the Schedule for the Assessment of Insight (SAI),
respectively.86 The availability of instruments that can be used to measure anosognosia in
large groups of patients has advanced this research area rapidly.
One issue on which there has been an emerging consensus is the percentage of
individuals with schizophrenia who have anosognosia. A study carried out by Amador
and his colleagues reported that 57% of patients with schizophrenia “had moderate to
severe unawareness of having a mental disorder.”87 Another study of eighty-seven stable
outpatients with schizophrenia, all of whom were receiving treatment, found that 50%
“were rated as having at least a moderate impairment in insight about their illness.”88 The
large MacArthur treatment competence study similarly found that approximately half of
the individuals with schizophrenia lacked an understanding of their illness and/or an
appreciation of the importance of treatment.89 Another study directly compared patients
with schizophrenia and patients with focal neurological disorders, such as strokes and
brain tumors, on awareness of their illnesses. Among the patients with schizophrenia,
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47% were unaware of their illness, while among the neurological patients, 57% were
unaware.90
Studies thus demonstrate that approximately half of all individuals with
schizophrenia have moderate to severe impairment in awareness of their illness.
Moreover, it appears that this impairment in awareness occurs somewhat more often in
individuals whose symptoms of schizophrenia are more severe,91 but that it is not a direct
product of delusions, depression, or other symptoms. Rather, the impairment in
awareness of illness seen in individuals with schizophrenia is itself a symptom of the
disease and is true anosognosia. Thus, it is the same phenomenon as is observed in many
neurological patients with strokes, brain tumors, Alzheimer’s disease, and Huntington’s
disease.
Studies of individuals with schizophrenia who also have tardive dyskinesia
illustrate the fundamental similarity of anosognosia found in schizophrenia and that found
in individuals with neurological disorders. Tardive dyskinesia is a side effect of
antipsychotic medication commonly used to treat schizophrenia and occurs in
approximately 10% of patients. It consists of involuntary movements of the tongue and
jaw and, in more severe cases, the arms and legs.
As early as 1970, it was noted that many individuals with schizophrenia who also
had tardive dyskinesia appeared to be unaware of their own involuntary movements.92
Since that time, at least eight studies have been carried out confirming this. In one study,
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for example, “75% of [the] patients were completely or partially unaware of their
abnormal involuntary movements”; in another study, “most of them (88%) were
oblivious to or not concerned with their abnormalities, despite noticeable disturbances of
speech that these symptoms incurred.”93 In 1985, Myslobodsky and his colleagues
correctly labeled this lack of awareness of symptoms of tardive dyskinesia a form of
anosognosia.94
Other studies have demonstrated that individuals with schizophrenia who are
unaware of their tardive dyskinesia are also likely to be unaware of their schizophrenia,
thus suggesting that unawareness of the neurological and psychiatric symptoms are part
of the same process.95 Studies of anosognosia in individuals who have schizophrenia and
tardive dyskinesia have also reported that some individuals who are unaware of their own
abnormal movements may be completely aware of similar abnormal movements in other
patients.96 This finding is similar to studies showing that individuals with schizophrenia
who are not aware of their own psychiatric symptoms, such as delusions and
hallucinations, may be fully aware of the same symptoms in other patients.”97
________________________________________________________________________
93

Giovanni Caracci et al., Subjective Awareness of Abnormal Involuntary Movements in Chronic
Schizophrenic Patients, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 295 (1990), and M. S. Myslobodsky et al., Cognitive
Impairment in Patients with Tardive Dyskinesia, 173 J. NERV. MENT. DIS. 156–60 (1985) (hereinafter
MYSLOBODSKY ET AL., COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT). See also George S. Alexopoulos, Lack of Complaints in
Schizophrenics with Tardive Dyskinesia, 167 J. NERV. MENT. DIS. 125 (1979); Celso Arango et al.,
Relationship of Awareness of Dyskinesia in Schizophrenia to Insight into Mental Illness, 156 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1097 (1999); Fabien Trémeau et al., Insight and Anosognosia of Tardive Dyskinesia in
Schizophrenia (abstract), 24 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 273 (1997) (hereinafter TRÉMEAU ET AL., INSIGHT AND
ANOSOGNOSIA); Arnold M. Rosen et al., Perception of Tardive Dyskinesia in Outpatients Receiving
Maintenance Neuroleptics, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 372 (1982); and James M. Smith et al., A Systematic
Investigation of Tardive Dyskinesia in Inpatients, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 918 (1979) (hereinafter SMITH
ET AL., A SYSTEMATIC INVESTIGATION).
94
MYSLOBODSKY ET AL., COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT.
95
TRÉMEAU ET AL., INSIGHT AND ANOSOGNOSIA.
96
SMITH ET AL., A SYSTEMATIC INVESTIGATION.
97
Mike Startup, Awareness of Own and Others’ Schizophrenic Illness 26 SCHIZOPHR. RES. 203–11
(1997). This discrepancy between self-observation and the observation of others is difficult for others to
comprehend. As one research group noted: “Although it is conceivable that these patients might have been

40

Another question that has received considerable research attention is whether
awareness of illness can be improved in individuals with schizophrenia. Attempts have
been made to do this with specific forms of psychotherapy98 and with antipsychotic
medications. Studies to date suggest that medication can improve awareness of illness in
approximately one-third of those for whom it is lacking, but the majority of individuals
do not show much improvement, even though other symptoms of their illness may
improve.99 Claims have also been made that one or another type of antipsychotic
medication is more effective in improving awareness of illness, but none of these claims
have been substantiated.100

3. Anatomical Localization of Anosognosia
Debate about the possible anatomical localization of anosognosia has been taking
place for a century. It was early noted that anosognosia in individuals with strokes and
brain tumors occurred most often when the brain lesions were in the right hemisphere.
Subsequent studies have confirmed that right hemisphere lesions are four times more
likely to produce anosognosia compared to left hemisphere lesions.101 Thus, it appears
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that brain circuits controlling self-awareness are situated predominantly in the right
hemisphere in the majority of people.
Attempts to localize the origins of anosognosia more precisely are continuing but
have yielded inconsistent data. A major reason for this is that, anatomically, brain areas
are discrete, but functionally, they are extensively interconnected with each other; thus,
abnormal function in one part of the brain inevitably affects many other areas.
Computerized tomography (CT) scans of individuals who have had strokes have
associated anosognosia with the inferior parietal lobule, the thalamus, and basal
ganglia.102 Other researchers have also stressed the importance of the inferior parietal
lobule in producing anosognosia in individuals with strokes and brain tumors, while
others have also suggested involvement of the insula.103 A CT scan study of individuals
with Alzheimer’s disease, in contrast to the above, reported abnormalities in the
prefrontal region in the right hemisphere, while a similar study of individuals with
Huntington’s disease suggested that the caudate portion of the basal ganglia was
associated with anosognosia.104
Attempts to localize the anatomical basis of anosognosia in schizophrenia have
also yielded conflicting data. Such attempts have been carried out using
neuropsychological testing and neuroimaging techniques such as CT and MRI scans.
Multiple studies have attempted to correlate measures of unawareness of illness, using
assessment scales such as described previously, with neuropsychological measures of
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frontal lobe function. The neuropsychological test most widely used has been one that
measures the ability of a person to rapidly shift their analytic mindset.105 The results of
these studies have been contradictory, with several claiming that anosognosia correlates
with impairment on this test, whereas others have reported no correlation.106 One attempt
has also been made to correlate unawareness of illness with neuropsychological measures
of parietal lobe function.107 A major problem with all such attempts using
neuropsychological measures is that such measures are relatively nonspecific for
anatomical areas of the brain.
The use of neuroimaging techniques to localize anosognosia in individuals with
schizophrenia has also yielded contradictory findings. Two studies examined the size of
the brain ventricles; one reported that enlarged brain ventricles were found more
frequently in individuals with impaired awareness of illness, but the other found no
association.108 Two other studies measured brain volume; one reported that decreased
brain volume occurred more commonly in individuals with decreased awareness of
illness, but the other study did not.109
Other researchers have focused neuroimaging attention to specific parts of the
brain. Two studies have reported decreased volumes of specific parts of the frontal lobe
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in individuals who have impaired awareness of illness, and another has reported
generalized atrophy of the frontal lobe in such cases.110 Still another study, carried out in
individuals with schizophrenia who had recently developed the disease, found that
deficits in the cingulate gyrus and insula correlated with poor awareness of illness.111
Given advances in neuroimaging techniques, such research is likely to move
forward rapidly in the coming years. At this point in time, the most that can be said with
certainty regarding the anatomical localization of anosognosia is that it primarily involves
the right hemisphere of the brain and that the inferior parietal and frontal lobes are
involved. The fact that there are very close connections between these two areas, as well
as to the thalamus and cingulate, which appear to also be involved in anosognosia,
provides a promising basis for future research.

4. Consequences of Anosognosia
It has been increasingly recognized that anosognosia may have adverse
consequences. Individuals who are unaware of their brain disorder often refuse treatment
and may behave in a manner that endangers themselves or other people.
For Alzheimer’s disease, such consequences were illustrated by the publicized
case of Ralph Thompson, an eighty-two-year-old man who suffered from this disorder.
On November 8, 2000, Mr. Thompson was stopped by a police officer in the District of
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Columbia for driving erratically. Mr. Thompson reacted angrily, challenging the officer
to either arrest him or let him go. Since there were no legal grounds for arrest, the officer
released him; eight hours later, Mr. Thompson died after his car swerved across the
median and hit two oncoming tractor-trailers. The news account of this tragedy noted that
“it can still be nearly impossible to rescue or help people who don’t know they need
either.”112
Other accounts verify the fact that “people with Alzheimer’s disease … are
increasingly getting entangled with law enforcement” because of their anosognosia.113
Most often, they are taken into police custody “after they wander away from their homes
or caretakers and are found acting erratically.”114 Occasionally, however, such individuals
commit crimes, including homicides, because of their brain dysfunction.
For individuals with schizophrenia, the consequences of anosognosia include
noncompliance with medication, relapse, homelessness, incarceration, and violent
behavior.

a. Noncompliance with Medication
There are many reasons why people do not take medication that has been
prescribed for them by a physician, including the cost of the medication, side effects, and
concurrent substance abuse, among others. For individuals with schizophrenia, however,
the main reason they do not take medication is anosognosia—they do not believe they are
sick and therefore do not believe they need medication.
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At least fifteen studies have identified lack of awareness of illness as a major
determinant of medication noncompliance in individuals with schizophrenia. In one
study, for example, individuals who were unaware of their illness were only half as likely
to take medication compared to individuals who were aware.115 In another study, 63% of
psychiatric patients with anosognosia were noncompliant with medications compared to a
24% noncompliance rate for patients who were aware of their illness.116 As reported in
another study, “the participants who were more aware of their mental illnesses and of the
beneficial effects of medication were more likely to be compliant with prescribed
medications.”117

b. Relapse, Homelessness and Incarceration
Since individuals with schizophrenia who have impaired awareness of illness are
less likely to be compliant with helpful medication, it logically follows that the outcome
of their illness is more likely to be problematic. Multiple studies have confirmed this.
For example, studies have shown that individuals with schizophrenia who are
noncompliant with medication have significantly more frequent and more severe relapses,
compared to individuals who are compliant.118 Additional studies have shown that having
impaired awareness of illness predicts more admissions to hospitals, and especially more
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involuntary admissions.119 In one of those studies, “only 8% of patients with insight
required hospitalization for their relapse, in contrast to 50% of those without insight.”120
Other studies have shown that individuals with schizophrenia with impaired
awareness of illness have poorer social and rehabilitation outcomes. One study found a
correlation between poor insight and poor social skills.121 A rehabilitation study similarly
reported that “poor insight was significantly related to fewer weeks of participation as
well as poorer social skills and personal presentation on the job.”122
Homelessness is a common outcome for many individuals with schizophrenia and
other severe psychiatric disorders, with multiple studies estimating that approximately
one-third of the homeless population have these disorders. Many of these individuals also
have problems with substance abuse. A 1989 study of individuals discharged from a state
psychiatric hospital reported that among those who became predominantly homeless,
63% were noncompliant with medication, whereas among those who remained in stable
housing, only 18% were noncompliant.123 Other studies have reported that
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noncompliance with medication is a risk factor for becoming homeless among men and
women with schizophrenia.124
Arrest and incarceration in jails and prisons is another increasingly common
outcome for individuals with schizophrenia and other severe psychiatric disorders. A
1998 Department of Justice survey reported that 16% of inmates in the nation’s jails and
prisons were mentally ill.125 This includes a growing number of mentally ill repeat
offenders, such as Gloria Rodgers in Memphis, who in 1998 was reported to have had
258 previous arrests and to have been jailed 114 times in the previous four years.126
As far as the authors are aware, no study has specifically assessed awareness of
illness among mentally ill prisoners. There is evidence, however, that such individuals
tend to have been noncompliant with medication prior to their arrest and therefore can be
assumed to have less awareness of their illness. One study of mentally ill individuals who
have been arrested found that “two highly significant predictors of arrest were substance
abuse … and noncompliance with medication.”127
A study of sixty-five patients with severe psychiatric disorders discharged from
an Ohio state psychiatric hospital illustrates the problem. Within six months, thirty-three
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of the sixty-five individuals had become homeless, and twenty-one of these had been
arrested and jailed. Most of them had been arrested for misdemeanors, such as
threatening and bizarre behaviors. The authors of the report noted that “psychotropic
medication had been prescribed upon their discharges from the state hospital, but the
respondents failed to take their medication.”128

c. Violent Behavior
Violent behavior by individuals with schizophrenia and other severe psychiatric
disorders is another important consequence of anosognosia. In recent years, three studies
have been carried out that link violent behavior directly to impaired awareness of illness.
One study, carried out in Ohio, assessed 122 patients with schizophrenia who had
committed violent acts and compared them with 111 patients with schizophrenia who had
not committed such acts. The violent patients had more symptoms and significantly less
awareness of their illness.129 A second study, carried out in New York, examined causes
of behavior in sixty severely mentally ill men who had been charged with violent crimes.
The authors reported that lack of awareness of illness and medication noncompliance
both played significant roles in causing the men’s violent behavior.130 Finally, a study
carried out in Spain on sixty-three patients with schizophrenia admitted to a psychiatric
hospital assessed both their violent behavior and their awareness of illness. The authors
reported a statistically significant association between impaired awareness of illness and
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increased violent acts and concluded that “the single variable that best predicted violence
was [impaired] insight into psychotic symptoms.”131
Finding a relationship between impaired awareness of illness and increased
violent behavior in individuals with schizophrenia is not surprising, since there is
abundant evidence that medication noncompliance is also linked to increased violent
behavior. Anecdotal stories abound and are frequently seen in media accounts of
tragedies, e.g., “his daughter was not taking her medication at the time of the slaying.”132
There are also multiple studies showing that individuals with severe psychiatric disorders
who are unmedicated or undermedicated are significantly more likely to commit violent
acts.133
In summary, anosognosia has important consequences for individuals with
schizophrenia and other severe psychiatric disorders. It is a major determinant of
medication noncompliance; increases the chances of relapse, homelessness, and
incarceration; and increases violent behavior. Any legislation bearing on the treatment of
psychiatrically ill individuals must take anosognosia into account.
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IV. The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act: California, 1969

One of the most important state mental health laws enacted in the late 1960s and
early 1970s was the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, widely referred to as LPS, which went
into effect in California on July 1, 1969.134 It was widely referred to as “the Magna Carta
of the mentally ill” and said to include “the broadest changes in the procedures for the
involuntary commitment of the mentally disordered since the process began in the early
1800s.”135
Speaking at the time the bill was passed, Assemblyman Frank Lanterman, the
prime mover of the legislation, said that “the entire thrust of the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act is to promote voluntary treatment for the mentally disordered. . . . provisions for
involuntary treatment have been written so that they are the last resort rather than the
first, as is now so often the case.”136 The legislation restricts initial involuntary
hospitalization to individuals who are dangerous to others, dangerous to self, or gravely
disabled and is for a maximum of 17 days. Suicidal individuals may be held involuntarily
for an additional 14 days. Involuntary commitments for up to 90 days beyond the initial
17 days are restricted to those individuals who are deemed to be “imminently dangerous”
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to others. This extended commitment had to be approved by a court hearing at which the
detained individual had the right to be represented by a lawyer and could demand a jury
trial. The criteria for approval of a 90-day commitment were very strict; as Lanterman
explained it, “physical evidence of danger must be displayed in a court of law.”137
The core of the LPS Act was “the absolute termination of indefinite periods of
involuntary commitment.”138 Under previous California mental health laws, commitment
criteria merely required that individuals be “of such mental condition that they are in
need of supervision, treatment, care or restraint.”139 This was basically a need-forhospitalization standard, and the length of such commitments could be indeterminate.
Under the new law, the only grounds for long-term commitment was imminent
dangerousness to others, and the commitment must be reviewed by the court every 90
days.
At the time of its passage, LPS was widely praised by legal advocates for mental
health reform. Prominent mental health law jurists such as Judge David Bazelon noted
that LPS “promises virtually to eliminate involuntary hospitalization except for short
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term crisis situations.”140 LPS was also praised by Bruce Ennis, the director of the New
York Civil Liberties Union Mental Illness Litigation Project, who called LPS “far from
perfect,” insofar as it retained grounds for any involuntary commitment, but commended
it for restricting such commitments “to persons who have committed dangerous acts and
are demonstrably dangerous to themselves or to others.”141 One of the most notable
aspects of LPS was the enthusiastic support it drew from both conservative and liberal
ends of the political spectrum.142

A.

Assumptions Regarding the Causes of Psychiatric Disorders

The assumptions underlying the LPS Act were laid out in The Dilemma of Mental
Commitments in California, a 1966 report of the California Assembly’s Subcommittee on
Mental Health Services. Assemblyman Nicholas Petris, the “P” in LPS, became chairman
of this subcommittee in June 1966. The report, often referred to as the Dilemma Report,
was the planning document for the LPS legislation.

________________________________________________________________________
140

MORRIS, CONSERVATORSHIP FOR THE “GRAVELY DISABLED,” quoting Bazelon, Implementing the
Right to Treatment 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 753 (1969).
141
Bruce Ennis, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LAW 223
(1972) (hereinafter ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY).
142
Frank Lanterman was a conservative Republican from Pasadena and one of the most powerful
members of the Assembly. He called himself “a conservative curmudgeon” and valued highly individual
rights and privacy (BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR 119). Southern California in the 1950s and 1960s was
the heartland of a conservative anti–mental health movement, most prominent in the John Birch Society,
which equated psychiatry with Communism. For example, in 1958, a large billboard was erected in
suburban Los Angeles that said: “It is amazing and appalling how many supposedly intelligent people have
been duped by such Communist Schemes as Fluoridation and ‘Mental Health’ especially since both the
American Legion and the D.A.R. have publicly branded ‘Mental Health’ as a Communist Plot to take over
our country” (see E. Fuller Torrey, NOWHERE TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY
ILL 88ff (1988)). Thus, there was widespread support among California conservatives for decreasing the
use of involuntary commitments and for phasing out state psychiatric hospitals. The second major sponsor
of the LPS Act, Nicholas Petris, was a liberal Democrat from Oakland. Liberal Californians supported LPS
and its restriction of involuntary commitments in order to protect civil rights.

53

The Dilemma Report discussed in detail the nature of mental illness, which it
defined as “a nonscientific, generalized, popular label used to explain or describe a wide
range of behavior which is considered ‘peculiar’ or ‘sick’ or ‘objectionable.’” The report
continued:

It is also evident that when a person’s behavior is labeled “mental
illness,” those who do the labeling are guided by their own conceptions
of what is normal and abnormal. Madness, like beauty, may exist in the
eye of the beholder.143

The sponsors of the LPS legislation clearly shared these assumptions about the
nature of psychiatric disorders. Frank Lanterman referred to patients in state psychiatric
hospitals as “unwanted, burdensome and eccentric members of society.”144 Similarly,
Nicholas Petris called the hospitals “warehouses for the idiosyncratic, the aged, the
senile, the odd, and the different” and further added: “We remembered that throughout
history some of today’s madman can become tomorrow’s heroes.”145 In stating such
views, Petris acknowledged having been influenced by the thinking of antipsychiatry
activists in San Francisco who at that time were publishing the “Madness Network
News.” Petris labeled as “provocative” their thesis “that either we are all mad or none of
us is mad.”146
The Dilemma Report and assumptions of the LPS architects were profoundly
influenced by antipsychiatry writers prominent in the 1960s. One of these was Thomas
Scheff, a sociologist at the University of California who believed that mental illness
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existed only because eccentric persons were so labeled. His writings were referenced
multiple times in the Dilemma Report and were also reflected by Petris when he claimed
that psychiatric professionals use a “middle-class model” in determining who may be
mentally ill.147
Also influential in the deliberations of the LPS architects was Don Jackson, a Palo
Alto psychiatrist who believed that families cause mental illness in general and
schizophrenia in particular. For example, Petris publicly claimed that “the ‘patient’ is
only one part of a family problem and . . . his bizarre behavior may be a very appropriate
response to other family members.”148 In the bibliography of the Dilemma Report,
Jackson’s writings were listed seven times, more than any other individual.149
Erving Goffman, a sociologist, was influential as well. The book for which
Goffman was best known, Asylums, was praised in the Dilemma Report as “a most
incisive and revealing study of the dehumanizing effects of institutional living.”150
Goffman had argued that the experience of being hospitalized for individuals labeled as
mentally ill was the cause of many of their symptoms. Such thinking was reflected in
Lanterman’s statement that, following commitment, “by the time the individual receives
any treatment, his condition is often worse than it was when he was apprehended.”151
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Finally, the architects of the LPS Act were influenced in their thinking about
psychiatric disorders by the writings of Thomas Szasz. Szasz, a psychiatrist, had
published The Myth of Mental Illness in 1961 and Law, Liberty and Psychiatry two years
later, and his ideas were being widely discussed in late 1960s. The Dilemma Report cited
Szasz as “a vocal champion of eliminating involuntary treatment” and referenced his
1966 article in the New York Times Magazine entitled “Mental Illness Isa Myth.” In the
article, Szasz said that “labeling someone mentally ill is a special kind of name-calling,”
and that stopping all involuntary commitments to mental hospitals and emptying the
hospitals are “to be sure…desirable goals.”152
In summary, the architects of the LPS legislation, which profoundly changed
commitment laws in California and influenced the laws in many other states, clearly did
not subscribe to biological theories of psychiatric disorders. Instead they claimed that
what is called mental illness was merely an arbitrarily assigned label for various forms of
deviant behavior. Since mental illness was merely a labeling problem, there was no legal
justification for the involuntary commitment of such individuals to hospitals.

B.

Assumptions Regarding Competence To Make Informed Treatment Decisions

The architects of the LPS Act believed that almost all individuals with psychiatric
disorders are competent to make informed decisions about whether or not they need
treatment. Lanterman noted that “individuals are involuntarily hospitalized and treated
with little regard to their own desires concerning hospitalization or treatment.” He
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explicitly rejected any suggestion that such individuals may not be aware of their own
illness:

For too many years the presumption has been that a mentally disturbed
individual will not admit to being “sick” and will not accept recommended
treatment. Therefore, it is thought necessary to contain him so he cannot
escape from treatment. This is sometimes justified on the grounds that
“the individual will later recognize it was all for his own good.” To me
this concept is indefensible.

The proposed legislation, said Lanterman, would free “thousands of persons from the
‘tyranny of help,’ which has camouflaged for so many years the denial of liberty and
basic human dignity.”153
The Dilemma Report explicitly assumed that individuals with psychiatric
disorders are rational and capable of making intelligent decisions regarding their own
needs. The report emphasized that under the LPS legislation “citizens will be free to
decide whether they wish to enter or leave the hospitals.” The report also claimed that
much disturbed behavior exhibited by hospitalized patients is not due to the fact that
patients are not capable of thinking rationally but rather is a byproduct of being
involuntarily hospitalized: “The virtual disappearance of antisocial and irresponsible
behavior when patients are treated and trusted as responsible fellow beings is most
convincing and forces us to a total re-examination of our traditional procedures.”154
At several points the Dilemma Report stressed the need for all treatment to be
voluntary:

“…these citizens will be voluntary patients in every sense”
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“…it is difficult to accept the notion that sending a wide variety of people
to institutions against their wishes can be justified because ‘they are in
need of treatment.’”

Making the treatment system a voluntary system would, according to the report,
fundamentally change the nature of state psychiatric hospitals. “When these steps have
been taken, state hospitals as we know them will no longer exist.”155
In summary, in repealing the existing civil commitment scheme and replacing it
with a scheme relying almost entirely on voluntary treatment, the LPS Act assumed that
most individuals with psychiatric disorders are competent and capable of seeking
treatment when they need it. There is no mention in the planning documents or legislation
that some individuals may have impaired awareness of their illness. The only
acknowledgement that impaired awareness was even possible was for individuals with
chronic organic brain syndromes such as may be found in individuals with chronic
alcoholism or Alzheimer’s disease. The LPS Act allowed for conservatorships in such
cases.156
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C.

The Effects of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act

California’s LPS Act influenced legislation in many other states. Washington
State implemented a similar law in 1974.157 By 1975, it was being said that “many
psychiatrists view LPS as the model law to be adopted by other states,” and
Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania were moving toward new legislation
“closely patterned after the success of LPS.”158 By 1988, it was noted that “most state
commitment statutes today are modeled after California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act.”159
In California, the changes in commitment procedures mandated by the LPS Act
brought about immediate changes in California’s mental health system. Since
commitments were so difficult to obtain, petitions for commitment orders decreased
sharply, and by 1978, it was said that there had been “a 99 percent decrease in the
number of petitions filed with the courts.”160 For the small number of mentally ill
individuals who were involuntarily admitted, the average length of hospital stay
decreased from 180 days prior to LPS to 15 days four years later.161
Furthermore, since many patients who were already in the hospitals at the time
LPS was implemented did not meet criteria of imminent dangerousness to others, they
had to be discharged. The number of patients in California state psychiatric hospitals thus
________________________________________________________________________
157

Morris, CONSERVATORSHIP FOR THE “GRAVELY DISABLED”; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
71.05.010–71.05.920 (1974). See also Lynne N. Henderson, “We’re Only Trying to Help”: The Burden
and Standard of Proof in Short-Term Civil Commitment, 31 STANFORD LAW REV. 425–55 (1979).
158
Donald G. Langley & James T. Barter, Community Mental Health in California 122 WEST. J.
MED. 271–76 (1975) (hereinafter LANGLEY & BARTER, COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH IN CALIFORNIA).
159
Steven P. Segal et al., Civil Commitment in the Psychiatric Emergency Room: II. Mental Disorder
Indicators and Three Dangerousness Criteria 45 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 753–58 (1988).
160
URMER, AN ASSESSMENT OF CALIFORNIA’S MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM.
161
Albert H. Urmer, Implications of California’s New Mental Health Law 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
251–54 (1975) (hereinafter URMER, IMPLICATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW).

59

decreased from 18,831 to 12,671 in the first two years following passage of LPS162 and
further decreased to 7,000 by 1973,163 a 63% decrease in just four years.
Many of the discharged patients went to live with family members and did well.
However, many others were housed in board-and-care homes. An observer in 1971 noted
that many of the board-and-care homes “are in most respects like small long-term state
hospital wards isolated from the community. . . . It is only an illusion that patients who
are placed in boarding or family-care homes are ‘in the community.’”164 A 1972 followup of 170 patients who had been discharged from state hospitals under LPS reported that
“more than two-thirds are living in an institutional setting,” including hospitals, boarding
homes, and prisons.165
Especially troubling was the fact that many of the board-and-care homes were
clustered in inner cities, often forming “ghettos of former state hospital patients.”166 In
San Jose in 1973, for example, it was said that “in a 20-square-block area—an area also
heavily populated by alcoholics, drug users, and prostitutes—live over 1,100 of the
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mentally disordered.”167 Most of them had come from nearby Agnews State Hospital,
which had closed in 1972.
Not surprisingly, many of the discharged patients who were not receiving
treatment became homeless, evoking protest “from an alarmed general public, concerned
for public safety.”168 The number of discharged patients who ended up homeless is also
reflected by studies of mentally ill persons in the Los Angeles County jail in the early
1980s: 36% of the mentally ill men and 42% of the mentally ill women had been
homeless immediately preceding their incarceration.169
LPS also produced an immediate increase in mentally ill persons in California’s
jails and prisons. In 1972 Marc Abramson, a psychiatrist in San Mateo County, published
data showing that the number of mentally ill persons entering the criminal justice system
had doubled in the first year after LPS was implemented. According to Abramson: “As a
result of LPS, mentally disordered persons are being increasingly subjected to arrest and
criminal prosecution.”170 In adjacent Santa Clara County, a study showed that the jail
population increased by 300% in the first four years after the closing of Agnews State
Hospital, located in that county.171 A five-county study in 1975 also reported a 300%
increase in severely mentally ill jail inmates over 10 years.172
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By 1981, twelve years after LPS had been implemented, the problem of an
explosive increase in mentally ill persons in California’s jails and prisons had been
clearly documented. A study of almost 500 mentally ill individuals who had been arrested
reported that “at the time of arrest, 94 percent were not involved in any outpatient
program.”173 A newspaper report, headlined “The Crime of Mental Health,” noted: “Jails
have replaced state mental hospitals as the new asylums for the insane. Reforms which
released mental patients from state hospitals unexpectedly stuck them on a merry-goround of streets, cops, courts and jails.” The reporter described mentally ill inmates in the
county jail such as those “who try to escape by smearing themselves with their own feces
and flushing themselves down the toilet.”174 By 1991, the Los Angeles County Jail had
become de facto “the largest mental institution in the United States” because of the large
number of mentally ill individuals among its 24,000 inmates.175
In 1972, in the first published evaluation of the effects of LPS on the criminal
justice system, Marc Abramson had observed: “It would indeed be ironic if the Magna
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Carta of the mentally ill in California led to their criminal stigmatization and
incarceration in jails and prisons, where little or no mental health treatment is
provided.”176 Within a decade, it was clear that Abramson’s prophecy had come to pass.
An increase in violent behavior by mentally ill persons who were not receiving
treatment was yet another unintended consequence of the LPS Act. This was politically
sensitive, since the issue of possible violent behavior by mentally ill persons had been
specifically raised several times during public hearings prior to passage of the LPS
legislation.
The first suggestion that violent behavior by mentally ill persons might be
increasing came from a 1973 study carried out by the California Department of Health.
Among 6,623 individuals convicted of murder, manslaughter, or felony assault during
1971, 760 of them (12%) had previously been in a state psychiatric hospital or treated in
a community mental health program. The rate of such crimes in the general population
for individuals ages 16 and over was 0.47 per 1000; for those treated in a community
mental health program, 2.88 per 1000; and for those treated in a state hospital 3.49 per
1000.177 By one account, in the first four years following passage of LPS, “At least 72 . . .
murders, suicides and ‘unfortunate accidents’ have directly involved former patients or
those who tried unsuccessfully to get psychiatric care.”178
Many of the homicide cases were high-profile, such as Charles Soper, who
murdered his wife and three of his five children, and Mary Maloney, who “decapitated
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her infant daughter and year-old son.”179 Santa Cruz County alone had twenty-eight
murders committed by severely psychiatrically ill individuals between 1970 and 1973.
John Frazier, for example, killed a prominent surgeon and four members of his family on
October 19, 1970; Frazier had paranoid schizophrenia, and his “wife and mother [had]
tried desperately to obtain psychiatric treatment for him.”180 Herbert Mullin, also
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, killed thirteen persons between October 1972 and
February 1973. Mullin had been hospitalized and prematurely released five times. At the
termination of Mullin’s trial, the foreman of the jury on the case wrote an open letter to
then Governor Ronald Reagan:

Five times prior to Mr. Mullin’s arrest he was entered into mental
facilities. At least twice it was determined that his illness could cause
danger to lives of human beings. . . . According to testimony at this trial,
Herb Mullin could and did respond favorably to treatment of his mental
illness. Yet, the laws of this state certainly prohibit officials from forcing
continued treatment of his illness, and I have the impression that they, as
a matter of fact, discourage continued treatment by state and county
institutions. . . . [My] convictions [are] that the laws surrounding mental
illness in the State of California are wrong, wrong, wrong.”181

The definitive study on the effects of LPS on violent behavior by mentally ill
persons was carried out by Larry Sosowsky at the University of California in Berkeley.
He compared the arrest rates for all hospitalized mentally ill persons from San Mateo
County for the three-and-a-half-year period before implementation of LPS and the four________________________________________________________________________
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and-a-half-year period following its implementation. He divided crimes into violent
offenses causing bodily harm (e.g., murder, assault, rape), violent offenses with the
potential for harm (e.g., robbery, possession of weapons, arson), and nonviolent crimes
(e.g., public intoxication, possession of drugs, petty theft).
The results of the study showed clearly that limiting commitment of mental
patients under LPS had increased crime. Comparing the pre-LPS to the post-LPS periods,
Sosowsky reported that violent offenses causing bodily harm increased three and a half
times; violent offenses with the potential for harm, one and a half times; and nonviolent
crimes, three times. He concluded that changes in hospital admission and discharge
policies, such as LPS brought about, “may well incur a heretofor unassessed social cost—
more crime and violence in the nation’s communities.”182
By 1975 it had also become clear that the transfer of clinical care from the state
psychiatric hospitals to the newly funded community mental health clinics had been a
failure. As envisioned by the architects of LPS, patients who were being discharged from
the hospitals were supposed to get follow-up outpatient care at the clinics. As noted by
Eugene Bardach in his book on the implementation of LPS, the community mental health
clinics “did relatively little to help the chronically mentally ill, even those who were
released from the state hospitals in the great wave of discharges following LPS.”183 In
one study, only 41% of the patients discharged from Napa State Hospital had received

________________________________________________________________________
182

SOSOWSKY, CRIME AND VIOLENCE, and Larry Sosowsky, Explaining the Increased Rate among
Mental Patients: A Cautionary Note 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1602–1605 (1980).
183
BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME 291.

65

follow-up psychiatric care in the community.184 Thus, it is not surprising that many of
them ended up homeless, incarcerated, or incarcerated for violent acts.

V. The Lessard Decision: Wisconsin, 1972

On October 29, 1971, Ms. Alberta Lessard was picked up at her apartment in
West Allis, Wisconsin, by two police officers and involuntarily committed to the
Milwaukee Mental Health Center for examination. This was the third time that day that
police had been called to her apartment. She was said to have been “running up and down
the apartment aisle on the second floor banging on doors and shouting that the
communists were taking over the country that night” and “threatening to jump off the
second floor window ledge.”185
A preliminary psychiatric evaluation found that Ms. Lessard was suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia and in need of treatment. Ms. Lessard retained counsel through
the Milwaukee Legal Services, which filed a class action suit on her behalf and on behalf
of “and all other persons 18 years of age and older who are being held involuntarily
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pursuant to any emergency, temporary or permanent commitment provision of the
Wisconsin involuntary commitment statute.”186
On October 18, 1972, a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court declared
Wisconsin’s existing civil commitment statute unconstitutional and handed down a
decision granting most of the provisions sought by the plaintiffs. The case was appealed
and ultimately made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which vacated and remanded it
in 1974 and 1975.187 In 1975, the Wisconsin Legislature then passed a law implementing
the provisions of the Lessard decision.
The three-judge panel reasoned, as summarized by one observer, that “under the
due-process provisions of the Constitution persons facing involuntary civil commitment
are guaranteed the full array of procedural safeguards formerly guaranteed only to
individuals charged with a crime.”188 These procedural safeguards included the right to
an initial hearing within 48 hours; the right to a full hearing within two weeks; the right
to trial by jury; the right to have the assistance of counsel; the right to be warned by the
examining psychiatrist “that statement [sic] he may make may be basis for commitment,
and that he does not have to speak to psychiatrist”;189 no admission of hearsay evidence;
proof of mental illness “beyond a reasonable doubt”; a strict standard of immediate
dangerousness as the only grounds for commitment; and the use of “involuntary
hospitalization only as a last resort”190 after all alternatives to inpatient commitment have
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been investigated and ruled out. The procedural safeguards in the Lessard decision
became known among legal advocates as “the ten commandments for the mentally ill.”191
From the viewpoint of psychiatric professionals, three aspects of the Lessard
decision were especially problematic. Having to warn patients that anything they say can
be used against them is antithetical to the traditional doctor-patient relationship; if
patients choose to remain silent, psychiatric examinations are impossible. Proof of
dangerousness “beyond a reasonable doubt” is much more difficult to achieve than “clear
and convincing evidence” or the “preponderance of evidence,” the standards of proof that
had traditionally been used. Finally, the criteria for dangerousness deemed necessary to
permit involuntary commitment were defined so strictly that the criteria would be
extremely difficult to meet; the Lessard decision said that “the state must bear the burden
of proving that there is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do
immediate harm to himself or others . . . and dangerousness is based upon a finding of a
recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another” (emphases
added).192 Because of this provision, the Lessard decision was called “the first landmark
case dealing with the concept of dangerousness . . . a high-water mark in ‘dangerousness’
law.”193
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A.

Assumptions Regarding the Causes of Psychiatric Disorders

Among the sources cited in support of their ruling, the three judges who rendered
the Lessard decision identified the statements by Bruce J. Ennis and Dr. Thomas S.
Szasz, both of whom had testified at Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Ill before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Robert H.
Blondis, one of the lawyers who represented Ms. Lessard and submitted the original
brief, said in an interview that his views on psychiatric disorders had also been strongly
influenced by Dr. Szasz’s books The Myth of Mental Illness (1961) and Law, Liberty and
Psychiatry (1963); “that is where I was coming from,” Blondis recalled. He said that he
had also been influenced by William Ryan’s Blaming the Victim (1971).194
In their ruling, the three-judge panel reflected the views of Ennis, Szasz, and
Ryan. Ennis, the director of the New York Civil Liberties Union Mental Illness Litigation
Project, had testified that “mental illness” is “at most a ‘theory’ to explain unconventional
conduct or belief. As such, its boundaries expand or contract according to the life styles
and value judgments of the theorist.”195 Szasz had explicitly stated that mental illnesses
do not exist “as scientific entities.”196 Ryan had similarly written that the state psychiatric
hospital patient populations consisted mostly of “the poor, the aged, the drunk and the
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inept petty criminal.”197 Thus, in their ruling the judges noted: “Obviously, the definition
of mental illness is left largely to the user and is dependent upon the norms of adjustment
that he employs. . . . The diagnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the mentally
diseased class almost any person he wishes, for whatever reason, to put there.”198 This
view suggests that there are no scientific definitions or boundaries for psychiatric
disorders but rather that they are simply relative categories of behavior.
In their ruling, the three-judge panel included two other statements that reflected
their assumptions regarding the causes of psychiatric disorders. Quoting from the 1970
Senate hearings, the judges noted that “often it is the drugs (i.e., medications) themselves
which are responsible for ‘crazy’ behavior.” And quoting Bruce Ennis’s Senate
testimony, they noted that there is “substantial evidence that any lengthy hospitalization,
particularly where it is involuntary, may greatly increase the symptoms of mental
illness.”199 In this view, when symptoms of a psychiatric disorder are present, the
symptoms may not signify a true disease but rather may be caused by medications being
given to the person or by the effects of hospitalizing the person.

B.

Assumptions Regarding Competence To Make Informed Treatment Decisions

The three-judge panel that rendered the Lessard decision clearly indicated their
assumptions regarding the competence of individuals with psychiatric disorders to make
informed treatment decisions: “Persons in need of hospitalization for mental illness
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should be allowed choice of whether to undergo hospitalization and treatment or not
unless the state can prove that the person is unable to make decision about hospitalization
because of nature of illness.”200 The court did not further define what it meant by “unable
to make decision” or how the state was supposed to establish this deficit. However, the
testimony of Bruce Ennis in the 1969 Senate hearings, which was cited multiple times by
the judges, included the following: “A patient suffering from cancer, heart disease, or
pneumonia can’t be committed, even for his own welfare. Apparently, involuntary
treatment of the mental patient is based on the assumption first, that he is incompetent to
make a ‘rational’ choice between liberty and treatment, and second, that he would, if
competent, choose treatment. There is not to my knowledge any evidence to support
either of these assumptions.”201
Overall, Bruce Ennis appears to have had a substantial influence on the judges
who rendered the Lessard decision. In 1969, Ennis had testified at the U.S. Senate
hearings: “Commitment because of alleged danger to self or to others should require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, based on a recent overt act or threat, that the person
would, if at liberty, inflict substantial physical injury upon himself or others within the
immediate future.”202 The 1972 Lessard decision included “beyond a reasonable doubt,”
“a recent overt act,” “substantial harm to oneself or another,” and “immediate harm” as
its standards for dangerousness.
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C.

Effects of the Lessard Decision

In 1976, legal scholar Alan Stone noted that the provisions of the Lessard
decision, if strictly followed, would “put a virtual end to involuntary confinement” of
individuals with psychiatric disorders.203 For Bruce Ennis and his associates, this was
exactly what they intended; Ennis wrote at the time that the ultimate goal of mental
health laws should be “nothing less than the abolition of involuntary hospitalization.”204
An analysis of the Lessard decision published one year after it was handed down
said that “the decision effectively obliterated a major portion of the Wisconsin civil
commitment statute”205 by limiting the use of parens patriae as grounds for involuntary
commitment and replacing it with dangerousness as the sole grounds. As summarized by
Darold A. Treffert, a Wisconsin psychiatrist who has written extensively about the
Lessard case: “Provisions for the state to use parens patriae powers in the absence of
dangerousness narrowly defined were effectively abolished; the pendulum swung entirely
to dangerousness in terms of imminent physical harm as the only authority on which the
state could infringe on individual liberty.”206 The decision also guaranteed that
individuals facing civil commitment would have many of the same procedural safeguards
as are given to individuals charged under the criminal law.
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The Lessard decision had a major influence on courts in other states. Prior to the
decision, according to one account, nine states used “dangerousness” as the sole criterion
for involuntary psychiatric hospitalization, but by 1980, “every state had changed its
statute to restrict hospitalization to persons who were dangerous to themselves or others
. . . or had interpreted its preexisting statute in a way so as to save it from being found
unconstitutional.”207 Many of the procedural safeguards included in the Lessard decision,
such as the right to trail by jury, were also adopted by other states. Similarly, between
1972 and 1980, 5 other states and federal courts copied the Lessard decision by adopting
“beyond a reasonable doubt” as the standard by which dangerousness and mental illness
should be judged; however, 14 other courts “rejected that standard as too demanding in
the context of civil commitment.”208
Overall, the Lessard decision was a major victory for the movement to restrict
involuntary commitment. As summarized in a 1975 overview of civil commitment laws:
“Both courts and legislation are moving more towards the police power concept of
‘dangerousness’ as a ground for commitment and away from the parens patriae concept
of ‘unable to care for self’ or ‘in need of mental treatment,’ because a deprivation of
liberty is a serious curtailment of personal rights and should only be imposed when
absolutely necessary.”209
In Wisconsin, the implementation and effects of the Lessard decision varied
widely from county to county. As described in a 1976 analysis: “Because many
Wisconsin county judges disagreed with much of the Lessard decision, and because
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much of the decision contained ambiguities, many of the fundamental Lessard
requirements were given interpretations that were so broad that they were rendered
meaningless.”210 There was a sharp decrease in involuntary admissions in most counties;
for example, at the Milwaukee County Mental Health Center, involuntary admissions
decreased by more than half from immediately prior to the Lessard decision to
immediately after it.211 At the same time, there was a sharp increase in criminal
commitments of individuals with serious psychiatric disorders to the three state
psychiatric hospital;212 bringing criminal charges against individuals with severe
psychiatric disorders is one of the only ways to get such individuals hospitalized when
civil commitment is no longer possible.
In Wisconsin counties in which the Lessard court definition of dangerousness was
strictly adhered to, it became almost impossible to get involuntary civil commitments for
individuals with serious psychiatric disorders. Darold Treffert documented these
difficulties in great detail, including, for example, the case of a man diagnosed with
schizophrenia who was in jail, overtly psychotic, and observed to be eating his feces from
the toilet bowl. When a psychiatrist recommended that he be committed to a psychiatric
hospital for treatment, the following court discussion took place:

Public defender: “Doctor, would the eating of fecal material on
one occasion by an individual pose a serious risk of harm to that person?
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Doctor: “It is certainly not edible material. . . . It contains
elements that are considered harmful or unnecessary.”
Public defender: “But, doctor, you cannot state whether the
consumption of such material on one occasion would invariably harm a
person?
Doctor: “Certainly not on one occasion.”

The public defender then moved to dismiss the petition for commitment on the grounds
that the patient did not meet the strict Lessard criteria for dangerousness. The judge
agreed, and the man was released.213
The consequences of the Lessard decision can also be measured by its effects on
the community. A few years after implementation of the decision, the governor of
Wisconsin “became concerned about the number of obviously mentally ill persons on the
streets of the capital who were wandering into the capital building and into his office.”214
As has happened in other states, the number of psychiatrically ill homeless individuals
continued to steadily increase in Wisconsin so that in 2000, shelter workers in Milwaukee
estimated “that half of the 2,000 or so who live on Milwaukee’s streets are chronically
and persistently mentally ill.”215
Similarly, in 1981, the Milwaukee Sentinel carried a series of articles entitled
“Mentally Ill Behind Bars,” detailing how mentally ill persons were being shunted to the
criminal justice system since implementation of the Lessard decision.216 Increasingly,
police realized that it was useless to try to get commitments for mentally ill individuals,
so they arrested them instead.
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In Madison, Wisconsin, the most common charges brought against mentally ill
persons who were arrested were “lewd and lascivious behavior (such as urinating on a
street corner), defrauding an innkeeper (eating a meal, then not paying for it), disorderly
conduct (such as being too loud), menacing panhandling, criminal damage to property,
loitering or petty theft.”217 By 2000, two decades after implementation of the Lessard
provisions, jail officials in Milwaukee claimed that “one-third of 2,500 inmates at the
county jail and the House of Corrections are suffering from a major mental illness,”218
Following the Lessard decision, there also appeared to be an increase in suicides
and violent acts by mentally ill individuals who were not being treated. Within three
months following implementation of Lessard, three deaths had been directly attributed to
the new law. Darold Treffert noted that “each of these patients needed commitment; none
qualified,” and he eloquently referred to such deaths as “dying with one’s rights on.”219
Violent episodes involving mentally ill individuals continued to occur regularly in
Wisconsin. Such episodes became especially common in Dane County, where the court
was said to place “heavy emphasis on the Lessard commitment standard, requiring the
defendant to be dangerous to himself or others.”220 In Madison, a community of 200,000,
such violent episodes peaked in a 13-month period in 1988 and 1989 during which “six
separate incidents resulted in four homicides, three suicides, seven victims wounded by
gunshot, and one victim mauled by a polar bear.”221 The last occurred when a mentally ill
man climbed into the den of the bear at the Madison zoo. Some observers attributed these
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incidents to “unduly stringent interpretations and applications of Wisconsin’s civil
commitment standards.”222 Responding to a public outcry following these incidents, the
strict county criteria for commitment were relaxed, with a subsequent decrease in violent
episodes.
Finally, what effect did the class-action Lessard decision have on Ms. Lessard
herself? Prior to the onset of her illness and her involuntary hospitalization, Ms. Lessard
had been a successful schoolteacher for 26 years and had also taught student teachers at
Marquette University. After the Lessard decision, Ms. Lessard was unable to work and
lived on Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). During the intervening years,
according to her recollection, she was involuntarily hospitalized “13 or 14 times” but
never took medications except when forced to do so during her brief hospitalizations.223
Ms. Lessard also acknowledged having been put in jail “maybe a dozen times” on
what she called “trumped up charges.” On two or three occasions, she says, she was
homeless, including two months of living on the streets of Milwaukee during the winter.
During the years since the Lessard decision, Ms. Lessard has filed numerous suits against
the government, including one seeking to declare “all elections from the time of Richard
Nixon’s illegal.” That suit was dismissed with a comment by the judge that “it is clear
from her complaint that the plaintiff wishes to challenge nearly every facet of government
in existence today.”224 When Ms. Lessard was recently asked in an interview if she
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believed that she had schizophrenia, she answered: “Absolutely not. I don’t have any of
the symptoms.”225

VI. Implications of the New Biology for Laws Governing
Involuntary Commitment and Treatment:
Principles for Consideration for the Future

Since the 1960s, there have been profound changes in state mental health laws,
especially those concerning the involuntary commitment and treatment of patients. We
have examined in detail two such laws, the 1969 Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act in
California and the 1972 Lessard decision, which led, after several overturnings, to new
legislation in Wisconsin. LPS and Lessard are perhaps the best-known statute and
decision in civil commitment law, particularly for their era. We have argued that their
assumptions about mental illness, and the brain, are seriously mistaken. Possibly because
of their influence, they are representative of other statutes and caselaw that also make
seriously inaccurate assumptions.
In both the LPS legislation and the Lessard decision, the legal changes were
predicated on assumptions regarding the probable causes of psychiatric disorders and the
competence of individuals who have been diagnosed with a severe psychiatric disorder to
make informed treatment decisions. We have examined these assumptions in detail, using
schizophrenia as the most common form, and representative example, of severe
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psychiatric disorders. Although scientific studies of bipolar disorder (manic-depressive
illness) and major depression with psychotic features are less abundant than those of
schizophrenia, those that do exist suggest that our conclusions probably apply to those
disorders as well.226 However, the conclusions appear not to be applicable to other
psychiatric disorders in which anosognosia is not a clinical feature.
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Regarding the causes of schizophrenia, we found that the architects of both LPS
and the Lessard decision were understandably influenced by the prevailing beliefs of that
era. They assumed that schizophrenia was a relative concept, a label that could be applied
arbitrarily and for which there was no scientific basis. The framers of LPS wrote that
“madness, like beauty, may exist in the eye of the beholder.”227 The three-judge panel
that handed down the Lessard decision wrote that “the definition of mental illness is left
largely to the user and is dependent upon the norms of adjustment that he employs.”228
Although every term has play around the edges—what H. L. A. Hart called open texture-these characterizations of mental illness are grossly exaggerated.229 Consistent with the
belief that definitions of mental illness were arbitrary was the belief that state psychiatric
hospitals were “warehouses for the idiosyncratic, the aged, the senile, the odd, the
different,” in the words of one of the sponsors of LPS,230 or “the poor, the aged, the drunk
and the inept petty criminal,” in the words of a writer who influenced the Lessard
decision.231
As we have demonstrated in part II, these assumptions about the causes of
schizophrenia are now known to be erroneous. Literally hundreds of studies have shown
that schizophrenia is a brain disease with measurable changes in brain structure and
function, and that these changes are not caused by medications being used to treat it. In
this sense, schizophrenia is in the same category of conditions as Alzheimer’s disease,
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Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, and other disorders known to be diseases of the
brain but whose precise causes are not yet known.
The architects of both LPS and the Lessard decision also assumed that individuals
with serious mental illnesses were competent to make informed treatment decisions. One
of the sponsors of LPS wrote that it was “indefensible” to presume “that a mentally ill
individual will not admit to being ‘sick’ and will not accept recommended treatment.”232
Similarly, Bruce Ennis, who strongly influenced the Lessard decision, wrote that “there is
not to my knowledge any evidence to support” the assumption that “the mental patient
. . . is incompetent to make a ‘rational’ choice between liberty or treatment.”233 Thus,
under LPS, “citizens will be free to decide whether they wish to enter or leave the
hospitals,” and under the Lessard decision, “persons in need of hospitalization for mental
illness should be allowed choice of whether to undergo hospitalization and treatment
. . .”234 As we have demonstrated in part III, these assumptions about the competence of
individuals with severe psychiatric disorders to make informed treatment decisions are, in
many cases, wrong. Approximately half of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder have anosognosia and are partially or completely unaware of their
illness. Many of these individuals are not competent to make rational treatment decisions
because they do not believe there is anything wrong with them or that they need
treatment.235 Anosognosia is a biologically-based deficit, and individuals with severe
psychiatric disorders who suffer from anosognosia are similar to individuals with
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Alzheimer’s disease, Huntington’s disease, or strokes. They are similar in the legally and
morally relevant respects. Actions by such individuals that are consequences of their
anosognosia must be seen as symptoms of an illness, and not as free, informed choices.
Because current scientific knowledge suggests that approximately half of persons
with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder lack insight into their illness and need for
treatment, we should inquire as to which, if any, consequences follow for mental health
law from these facts. Consistent with the rest of this Article, we will describe the
consequences for civil commitment. However, similar conclusions could be drawn for
coerced treatment.
There are two kinds of jurisdictions. The first requires competence for
commitment; the second does not. This much follows as a matter of logic. Approximately
ten jurisdictions have some kind of incapacity prerequisite for commitment explicitly in
their statutory criteria. 236 Careful analysis reveals that some of those requirements are not
really a form of incapacity.237 Therefore, it might appear that fewer than ten jurisdictions
require incapacity, but that conclusion would be premature. Some jurisdictions have
incapacity as a result of judicial decisions, whereas other jurisdictions sneak incapacity in
by the back door.238 Without a thorough, time-consuming and probably unrewarding
investigation, it is unclear how many jurisdictions require incapacity.
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Whatever the distribution, in those jurisdictions that require incapacity,
anosognosia is evidence of legally relevant lack of insight, which is itself evidence of
incapacity. Many legal theorists have argued that lack of insight is either nearly sufficient
for incapacity, or else justifies commitment and coerced treatment as well or better than
incapacity.239 Because approximately half of persons with schizophrenia or bipolar
disorder have substantial or severe lack of insight, the strong presumption of capacity in
doctrine and practice in California under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, and in
Wisconsin under the Lessard decision, is misguided and should be discarded in
consequence of advances in scientific knowledge. So too should jurisdictions with strong
presumptions that follow California or Wisconsin, or that have independent grounds for a
strong presumption, discard those presumptions.
We cannot overemphasize the importance of psychiatrists, lawyers, and courts
paying greater attention to lack of insight. Still, we will not move too far in the opposite
direction. We wish to replace dogmatism with reason, not with an opposing dogmatism.
Our view is that lack of insight is substantial evidence of incapacity that should lead to
further inquiry, not that it is conclusive.
If, because you lack insight, you irrationally believe that you are not mentally ill,
do not have pathological symptoms, and do not need treatment, it may nonetheless seem
natural from your perspective to reject treatment. But those beliefs block your ability to
make an informed, free, capable decision because the existence of pathological
symptoms, illness, and need for treatment are crucial facts necessary for informed
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decision making. A rational inference from seriously unjustified beliefs is generally not a
capable decision, or a capable mental health treatment decision.240
Perhaps surprisingly, many individuals who lack insight, or the capacity to make
mental health treatment decisions nonetheless accept treatment. There is no reason to
waste government resources overseeing such individuals even if they meet the criteria for
commitment. We have better ways to employ our scarce resources.
In summary, in jurisdictions that require incapacity for commitment, recent
advances in our understanding of lack of insight suggest that there should be no strong
presumption of capacity in doctrine or practice. Rather, it is likely, but not certain, that
most persons who lack insight lack capacity. Moreover, most, but not all persons who
lack insight will refuse treatment241; if there were to be any presumption, it should be in
the other direction. But it is probably better to have no presumption, and put the State to
its proof. Our most important point, however, is that all actors in the commitment and
coerced treatment system should pay more attention to anosognosia and its consequences.
Both in jurisdictions that require incapacity for commitment, and those that do
not, lack of insight is evidence, but not conclusive evidence, for both mental illness and
dangerousness, the two nearly universal requirements for civil commitment by statute in
American jurisdictions,242 and perhaps nearly all foreign jurisdictions as well. Most
commentators believe the two are Constitutionally required by Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71(1992),243 but a careful analysis rejects that interpretation.244 In those jurisdictions
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that do not require incapacity for commitment, as well as those that do, lack of insight is
still relevant to proof of mental illness and dangerousness.
There are two possible routes by which lack of insight could help prove mental
illness or more severe mental illness. First, there might be a correlation, although
certainly not direct, between severity of lack of insight and severity of illness. More
likely, there are known correlations between lack of insight, and failure to accept
treatment. Additionally, failure to accept treatment is correlated with more severe illness.
Finally, more severe illness is correlated with greater dangerousness and violence. Thus,
lack of insight is evidence of greater mental illness and greater dangerousness. It is
relevant to commitment even in jurisdictions that do not require competence for
commitment. 245
Our normative consideration is that lack of insight, or lack of appreciation, better
justifies coerced treatment than incapacity read as lack of practical reasoning ability, that
is, lack of ability to rationally choose from among possible mental health treatments,
including deciding to accept none. This holds for two reasons. First, it is unclear how so
244
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many courts and commentators could have thought that inability to reason by a method
that has a good chance of picking the best, or a good treatment, justifies paternalistic
government intervention. That is to take a socialsciencecentric perspective. It is to force
cost-benefit rationality upon others, on pain of denominating them incapable. That
persons with mental illness do not make decisions as the advocates of practical reason
would recommend does not justify coercing those individuals. On the other hand,
individuals who don’t realize that they are ill, or how ill they are, or that they need
treatment—who lack insight—cannot make free and informed decisions. The inability to
make free and informed decisions has justified state paternalism in both legal doctrine
and philosophical writings for centuries.
Moreover, because lack of insight is easier to determine than inability to
rationally choose—indeed, the concept of rationality itself is controversial—intervening
on the basis of lack of insight results in the law being more reliable and certain. When the
law is more reliable and certain, persons have more liberty because they know better
where their liberty ends and the law’s coercion begins. Moreover, where the law is more
certain, persons are treated alike when appropriate more often, and the law treats its
subjects more frequently with equal concern and respect. Finally, by basing coercion on
lack of autonomy, rather than lack of practical reasoning ability, the state treats its
citizens more justly, and also more equally. We do not want to follow Vince Lombardi,
who said, “I treat all my players equally. Like dogs!” 246
Given the current state of knowledge regarding the causes of severe psychiatric
disorders and the competence of some individuals affected by these disorders, we might
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also ask what principles should be considered in framing future legislation? The
following three principles should be considered:

A.

Individuals with schizophrenia and other severe psychiatric disorders should be
regarded as equal to individuals with other chronic brain disorders

The category of “psychiatric disorders,” as defined by the American Psychiatric
Association, includes an extremely wide and diverse group of behaviors. It is now clear
that a subset of these that includes schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression
consists of biologically-based brain diseases. As such, these disorders should be treated
legislatively in the same manner as other brain diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease,
Parkinson’s disease, and multiple sclerosis. Thus, there should be no discrimination
against individuals with these psychiatric disorders for public programs such as Medicaid
or Medicare coverage or for private programs such as medical insurance coverage.
Insofar as discrimination exists, it should be corrected by legislation.

B.

An assessment for anosognosia should be routinely included in all determinations
of competency

Since studies have clearly demonstrated that many individuals with severe
psychiatric disorder have anosognosia, its assessment should be included in all
competency determinations. As noted in section III, there are now a variety of
anosognosia assessment scales that can be used for this purpose.
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It is important to assess anosognosia, because it has been shown in individuals
with schizophrenia to be the single most important determinant of medication
noncompliance. Medication noncompliance, in turn, is a major determinant of relapses,
readmissions to hospitals, homelessness, incarcerations, and violent behavior among
individuals with schizophrenia. Thus, for an individual with schizophrenia who has a
history of incarceration or violence, an assessment of anosognosia would be helpful to
judicial authorities in recommending the conditions under which the person should be
allowed to live in the community.247

C.

Specific Proposals: Provision for assisted treatment should be available in all
states and used when necessary

Since medication compliance is critical for successful community living for many
individuals with severe psychiatric disorders, and since individuals with anosognosia are
less likely to take medication because they do not believe they are ill, assisted treatment
should be available and used when necessary. Many forms of assisted treatment are
available, all of which involve some degree of coercion. These include representative
payeeship, conditional release, outpatient commitment, conservatorships and
guardianships.
Representative payeeship as a form of assisted treatment occurs when another
individual, assigned by the court, is the recipient of the affected individual’s SSI, SSDI,
VA disability check, or other financial support and when medication compliance is a
condition for releasing the funds. For individuals with severe psychiatric disorders,
________________________________________________________________________
247

TORREY, THE RELATIONSHIP OF INSIGHT TO VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND STIGMA 243.

88

studies have shown representative payeeship to be effective in reducing rehospitalization,
substance abuse, and homelessness.248
Conditional release occurs when patients who have been legally committed to a
hospital are released on the condition that they follow treatment instructions, including
taking medication when indicated. Violation of the condition may result in involuntary
rehospitalization, or a rehearing on whether rehospitalization is proper. Forty states have
laws permitting conditional release,249 but it is used primarily for criminally committed
patients. In most states, the director of the state psychiatric hospital, or her agent, has the
authority to issue conditional releases without asking permission of the court.250 In New
Hampshire the permission has also been legally delegated to the directors of state-owned
community mental health centers. New Hampshire has deployed conditional release
particularly widely in civil cases. In these circumstances, conditional release decreases
violence.251 Among forensic patients, conditional release has been shown in studies in
Oregon and other states to be highly effective in reducing future criminal behavior.252
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Outpatient commitment occurs when a court orders a patient to comply with
treatment, usually including medication, as a condition for living in the community.
Violation of an outpatient commitment order can result in involuntary inpatient
commitment, or rehearing and involuntary hospitalization. Schopp has developed a
particularly powerful argument why a failure to comply with an outpatient order may
justify inpatient commitment. He argues that under the least restrictive alternative
doctrine failure to comply with the outpatient commitment order may demonstrate that
the respondent is incapable of living safely as an outpatient.253 Some form of outpatient
commitment is available in forty-two states but is little used in most of them.254 Multiple
studies have demonstrated that outpatient commitment for individuals with severe
psychiatric disorders is effective in increasing treatment compliance and in decreasing
psychiatric readmissions, episodes of violence, and arrests and incarcerations.255
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Conservatorships or guardianships occur when an individual is assigned by the
court to make decisions for another person who is considered not to be competent. In the
United States, they are widely used for individuals who have moderate or severe mental
retardation and for individuals with neurological conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease.
Conservatorships and guardianships are theoretically available in most states for
individuals with severe psychiatric disorders but have been little used except in
California.
D.

Moral Justification for the Significance of Anosognosia and for the

Existence of Assisted Treatment

These various forms of assistance have been shown to reduce violence, arrests,
incarceration, treatment costs from inpatient commitment, homelessness, and substance
abuse, although not each form of assistance has yet been demonstrated by empirical
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studies to reduce each of these social problems. Despite these considerable virtues, some
will object that coercion violates autonomy rights and therefore cannot be justified.
We will respond to this concern by distinguishing three circumstances. First, we
will consider individuals who are dangerous to others. Second, we will examine
individuals who lack the relevant capacity. Our third, and most controversial claim,
considers individuals who are partly, but not completely, incapacitated. Most of these
individuals, if dangerous, will be mostly dangerous to self. Because our position in this
area is the most novel and controversial of these three circumstances, we will examine it
at greater length.
Nearly every current scholar maintains that dangerousness to others, in
combination with mental illness, and perhaps beneficial treatment, justifies coercive
commitment.256 The overwhelming majority of states agree. Society has also found
danger to others from disease and illness sufficient to justify coercive reductions in
liberty. For example, many states commit individuals with tuberculosis, especially if they
are incapable of following, or fail to follow, prescribed treatment regimens.257 When we
believed that leprosy was very contagious, we isolated persons with leprosy from society
by sending them to “lepers’ colonies” on remote islands or in special hospitals.258
Similarly, the driving privileges of individuals with epilepsy are restricted when their
epilepsy is not controlled.259
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In connection with civil commitment, some would restrict the use of the term
‘dangerous’ to the level of dangerousness required for inpatient commitment. Were that
perspective correct, assisted treatment could rarely be justified on the basis of
dangerousness, because few individuals who are that dangerous are safe enough to be
treated in the community. A more thoughtful approach, however, analyzes ‘dangerous’ as
relative to context. Dangerous is defined as a level of risk that is worth reducing a
particular amount in light of the cost of less risky alternatives. 260 Consider an individual
who is not so dangerous as to meet the test for dangerousness required for inpatient
commitment. Still, that individual might create a significant risk of injury to others. If the
cost of placing that individual on outpatient commitment—conceived broadly—is less
than the value of the reduction in risk that would be expected to result from that
placement, then the individual meets the less stringent test of dangerousness for
outpatient commitment. We conclude that an appropriate level of dangerousness to others
will support coercion for assisted treatment.
Philosophers, mental health law scholars, and courts all agree that individuals
who are incapacitated in the relevant area—whether it be mental health treatment
decision making or handling finances—are justifiably subject to paternalistic
intervention.261 Some would say that such persons, because they lack the relevant
capacity, are not autonomous, and therefore have no relevant rights. A more respectful
description is that because they are unable to capably act on their own behalf, the state is
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permitted, and perhaps morally obligated, to act in these individuals’ interests or to
delegate that task to others.262
Some would urge that paternalistic intervention is justified only if the
incapacitated individual receives a benefit. For example, in commitment they must
receive beneficial treatment,263 but not just any beneficial treatment will do. To take an
extreme example, taping the broken toe of a manic patient to reduce pain, and therefore
minimally reduce stress and mania, will not suffice as beneficial treatment. On the other
hand, providing that treatment that has the best combination of excellent prospects for
minimizing the illness while avoiding side effects is a beneficial treatment. There remains
room for disagreement over intermediate cases. Is a well intended, but poorly thought
out, treatment plan beneficial treatment? Can massage and reflexology therapy be
beneficial treatment? The question of what is beneficial treatment that could justify
paternalistic intervention deserves more extensive discussion than it has received in the
literature. We will say more about it in a moment. For now, we will simply note that most
think that massage mostly provides temporary relief from stress and is therefore a mere
interest of the patient. This may explain why many have doubts that massage can be a
beneficial treatment. It also explains why patients who believe that massage reduces
stress and therefore treats mania on a long-term basis believe that it is a beneficial
treatment. By contrast, treatment with excellent prospects for maximizing mental health
is clearly a beneficial treatment because it maximizes the basic good of mental health,
which is itself instrumental to autonomy and ordinary, non-basic goods in the future.
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Most rights theorists contend that only when a person is incapacitated in the sense
of not being autonomous is paternalistic intervention defensible. Dangerousness and lack
of autonomy, however, will not support all cases of assisted treatment. For example,
some outpatient commitment laws, such as Kendra’s Law264 and Laura’s Law,265 do not
require total incapacity. Nor do most payeeship relationships. Might coercion in these
circumstances nevertheless be justifiable? Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we shall
urge that there are circumstances in which partial, but not complete, impairment will
justify paternalistic intervention. But we must first take a small detour into the
justification for the conventional wisdom before exploring our disagreement with it.
Deontological, or rights-based, theories receive powerful support from certain
counterintuitive results that appear to flow from consequentialist theories.
Consequentialist theories, a generalization of utilitarianism, maintain that the morally
preferred action is that one that will maximize the amount of good, or things of value.
Such theories have been critiqued from the perspective of rights theorists,
including advocates of strong autonomy rights, by hypotheticals such as the following. It
would appear that if five friends of Smith want to use his car to go to a great party, and he
is going to use the car to drive one block to the corner store for milk, then it maximizes
the good (utility, preference satisfaction, what have you) for his friends to take Smith’s
car to the party. It therefore seems that consequentialism requires Smith to let them use
the car; he should walk to the store.266 But our intuitions about what it means to own the
car include his right to loan the car or not at his whim. This is not to say that Smith
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cannot be criticized as selfish, a character flaw. Rather, we are merely asserting that it is
morally permissible for Smith to exercise his right.
A more familiar form of this example states that we should not cut up one
individual, distributing his kidneys, lungs, and heart to five hopeful organ recipients, at a
net gain of four lives. Rather, his right to life trumps the net gain in lives.
Rights theorists therefore urge that we may not violate rights, especially
autonomy rights for the sake of well-being, or even other rights. This has been thought to
apply even to an individual’s own rights: I may not take your car without your
permission, even in certain pursuit of two better cars, which I give to you. A
consequentialism of rights, so to speak, is not permissible. One principle that rights
theorists frequently promote is that we cannot violate A’s right for the sake of B’s right or
interest. We have just seen that a second such principle has been advocated: one may not
violate A’s right for the sake of a greater amount of rights or goods for A. But we believe
that there is an exception to this principle when the individual partially or completely
lacks certain capacities, as the following examples demonstrate.
We take keys away from friends of ours who are drunk and intend to drive. Some
cases involve individuals who are dangerous to others. Other cases involve individuals
who are completely incapacitated. However, there will be some circumstances in which
the driver is only partly incapacitated and risks injury only to himself, perhaps because
the route that he will take involves only his own private property. Even in these cases, we
paternalistically intervene.
We will now describe cases that involve mostly dangerousness to self and that can
be described so as to involve only dangerousness to self. We prevent children from
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playing on the highway. We prevent children and delusional persons from jumping from
tall buildings in the belief that they can fly. We prevent people from committing suicide
without stopping to determine if they are even partially incapacitated. These cases may be
described as preventing injury to self, although the highway example might be better
described as putting oneself in a situation creating a great likelihood of being injured by
others. At times, we draft people into the military. Although these individuals may not be
dangerous to others, a public safety rationale exists since they are trained to support an
effort to reduce risks to the public. On the other hand, of course, the draft often increases
risks to the drafted individual.
Examples best described as coercing people in order to improve their health, a
basic good, include forcing children to take their medicine and enforcing advance
directives when the current self objects and is legally incompetent. Notice that basic
goods, like health and mental health, are instrumental for many—if not most—
autonomous activities, and many interests or ordinary goods. A third class of cases does
not require dangerousness by or to the coerced individual. For example, we coerce
children and teenagers into attending school in order to have greater capacities for action
and abilities to participate in public governance after attainment of majority. Coercion
appears justified here in order to create greater autonomous abilities in the future. We are
less comfortable coercing children or others into playing the trumpet, so as to receive
pleasure or have one more ability in the future, by contrast to forcing individuals to
accept treatment or obtain a basic education.
These examples provide evidence that we are justified in coercing individuals
even when they are partially autonomous and not completely lacking in autonomy or
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totally incapacitated. Three general principles appear to be applicable here, although
these should be taken as guidelines with the expectation of occasional counterexamples.
First, the more dangerous an individual is, the more justified are coercive restraints.
Second, the less capable an individual is, the more comfortable we are with paternalistic
intervention. Third, the greater the benefit that the individual is likely to receive, the more
justified we are in infringing on her liberty. In considering benefits, restricting liberty is
best justified by greater autonomy in the future. Secondarily, restricting liberty is, at the
next level, best justified by increasing basic goods, like mental health, that are
instrumental to most autonomous activities and non-basic goods. Finally, we consider
ordinary goods and interests in determining the magnitude of the benefit that an
individual receives.
We will now apply these principles to assisted treatment. Providing treatment to
individuals who would be dangerous in the community without assisted treatment, but are
likely not to be dangerous with assisted treatment, is justified. Whether providing assisted
treatment to a dangerous individual that probably would reduce the risk that the
individual would injure others but not to the point of not being dangerous is justified
depends on the facts of individual cases. Individuals who are incapacitated in the relevant
respect may be provided with assisted treatment if they are likely to benefit from it. The
greater the benefit they are likely to receive, the more comfortable we are about
intervening on their behalf. Finally, when an individual is partially incapacitated, whether
assisted treatment is justified will depend upon the kind and magnitude of the benefit that
the individual receives.
E. The Constitution
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We conclude with some broader remarks about the proper interpretation of the
Constitution, what statutes in this area should look like, and some broad policy
implications that follow from our examination of anosognosia.
Most scholars interpret the United States Constitution and the Constitutional
cases of the Supreme Court as requiring both mental illness and dangerousness for
commitment. In fact, the above argument demonstrates that dangerousness is not required
by the Constitution because incapacity suffices, and, moreover, mere impairment suffices
under appropriate circumstances.
Additionally, Supreme Court doctrine, especially Foucha v. Louisiana, does not
require dangerousness, despite widespread belief to the contrary. In Foucha v.
Louisiana,267 language in the plurality opinion asserts that the Constitution requires both
mental illness and dangerousness, but the Court's statements about dangerousness are
both dicta and based upon a misunderstanding of the Court's prior opinions in Jones v.
United States,268 and O'Connor v. Donaldson.269 Whether substantive due process
requires dangerousness was not before the Court. Moreover, as Justice Thomas noted in
his dissent, Jones held that mental illness and dangerousness was constitutionally
sufficient for commitment, whereas the plurality of the Court misstated Jones as holding
that mental illness and dangerousness were necessary for a commitment that is
constitutional.270 More importantly, the plurality had only four votes. Justice O'Connor
made it clear that her fifth and deciding vote was premised upon the opinion applying
only to Louisiana's criminal commitment statute, and does not apply to other more
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narrowly drawn criminal commitment statutes. A fortiori, the opinion does not apply to
civil commitment statutes: "I write separately, however, to emphasize that the Court's
opinion addresses only the specific statutory scheme before us, which broadly permits
indefinite confinement of sane insanity acquittees in psychiatric facilities."271
Moreover, Justice O'Connor reiterated that Jones had noted that psychiatry is an
inexact science, and that for that reason, "'courts should pay particular deference to
reasonable legislative judgments' about the relationship between dangerous behavior and
mental illness."272
Those scholars who do not believe dangerousness is required under the
Constitution believe that either dangerousness or incapacity is required.
In our view, what the Constitution requires is a need for treatment and either some
degree of enhanced risk or some degree of impairment and a benefit/treatment reasonably
designed to satisfy the need for treatment, that is, likely to alleviate the degree of
dangerousness or impairment that justifies the particular commitment. The commitment
and treatment may be continued past the point at which that particular patient no longer
meets the Constitutional minimum required to trigger commitment if the treatment is
likely to reap substantial gains in stabilizing the illness without being an undue hardship
on the patient.
Various forms of outpatient commitment that require less intrusive treatment
constitutionally require correspondingly lesser degrees of dangerousness/risk and
impairment, and will generally necessitate lesser amounts of benefit/treatment.
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F.

Statutes

At a minimum, statutes must meet the strictures of the Constitution. Thus,
inpatient commitment will require an appropriate level of dangerousness or impairment
or both. But to the extent that funds permit, states should be encouraged to provide more
than the minimum required treatment. Statutes should explicitly state that tests for lack of
insight are evidence of degrees of impairment.
Once again, outpatient treatment should involve a sliding scale of prerequisites
corresponding to the degree of intervention. Moreover, there should be a sliding scale of
treatments depending upon the type and severity of the illness that gives rise to the
justification for the variety of outpatient commitment.

G.

Policy

As has been implicit in discussion of outpatient commitment, the recent
emergence of various forms of mandatory community treatment should be encouraged
and extended. The forms of treatment should not merely be a continuum of severity of
illness, but, more subtly, should take into account different illnesses, different ways of
being ill within the same illness, and different levels of intervention. The forms of
treatment are best thought of as a subset of a continuum of continua.
Moreover, the law should find ways to intervene other than bipolar on-off
interventions: either you are committed, or else you are not committed. By contrast,
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social interactions both permit and require gradually greater interventions before applying
for commitment is justified.
Our social conventions dictate that, in general, informal mechanisms to minimize
or prevent dangerous behavior—including, dangerousness to self—be attempted prior to
applying for commitment, guardianship, or coerced medication.273 For example, if we
encounter a stranger who appears to be a deteriorating or psychotic consumer, we might
ignore him. Particularly if she appears to be engaged in self destructive or dangerous
behavior, we may first attempt to point out the potential negative consequences of her
behavior. If she is not persuaded to alter her behavior, we may engage in more detailed
or aggressive argument, including an attempt to show that her behavior is inconsistent
with nearly universal community values, or that it is illegal or immoral. We might see if
we could help her to get treatment. We might attempt to persuade or argue that she
would benefit from treatment, or should at least try it. But unless she meets the criteria
for civil commitment, and even then, we are unlikely to do more.
However, if a consumer is a friend, then, under the same circumstances, we might
well do more. First, we might be more aggressive in our attempts at persuasion or
argument. We might attempt to show that his behavior is not merely inconsistent with
nearly universal community values, but also with values he holds dear, to provide a more
potent reason for him to take risk-reducing steps. We might think that we have a duty to
attempt to persuade our friend into treatment, or at least to consider the options
thoughtfully. If unsuccessful, we might resort to cajoling him, or even attempt
manipulation, particularly if he is a close friend. Second, if unsuccessful on this
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occasion, we might later check in with our friend to see how he is doing. On some of
these occasions, we might again attempt to persuade him to obtain treatment, or marshal
its virtues. If unsuccessful, we might resort to cajoling him, or even attempt
manipulation. If still unsuccessful, and if the risk is sufficiently serious, we might inform
persons closer to him of our concerns, or at least determine if they are aware of the
situation. We might call a closer friend, partner, spouse, sibling, parent, child, or
employer with the hope that they will have more success in influencing him. If they are
not aware, we will disclose our concerns and encourage them to act, especially because
they have more influence and informal, social authority over him. Relatives will be even
more likely to view themselves as having an obligation to help in an appropriate way.
Whether stimulated by another's concern, or based upon their own observations as a close
friend or relative, if talk is ineffective, they might bring him to the hospital by subterfuge,
or with mild coercion or force. Unless immediate action is indicated, they may
substantially or completely exhaust informal influence and control mechanisms before
initiating formal legal intervention such as commitment or guardianship proceedings.
Indeed, as a society, we frequently view premature initiation of legal proceedings as
antitherapeutic,274 just as courts are rightly suspicious of premature lawsuits.
Depending upon the circumstances, we may be more interventionist. Given the
irreversibility of jumping from a tall building, and the exigency when someone is poised
to jump, we may use force to restrain a potential jumper prior to launching an inquiry into
her disability or incapacity, if any. Sometimes when we are uncertain if intervention is
socially or morally justified, we may intervene yet be prepared to back off if new
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evidence or consequences warrant. This scenario is more likely when the negative
consequences of inaction are of great magnitude.275
When premature, resort to legal process may reflect poorly on friends, colleagues,
and family. By the same token, failure to be adequately responsive to informal
mechanisms may provide justification for inquiry respecting potential disability, or even
modest but rebuttable evidence of disability itself.
A good lawyer or advocate for commitment or coerced treatment would be well
advised to present evidence of inappropriate responses to informal interventions as part of
the case for formal intervention. Conversely, advocates for a respondent or a defendant
should explore inappropriate informal interventions, or failure to attempt informal
methods prior to initiating legal action. For example, if a merchant who is overcharged
by his supplier fails to communicate with the supplier in order to resolve the discrepancy,
and instead, sues, the court will be justified in castigating the merchant for prematurely
bringing suit, and probably wasting scarce court resources.
However, failure to respond does not always justify inferences to possible
significant disabilities. When the same issue has been discussed on forty prior occasions,
and family members are entrenched in opposed positions, an aggressive attempt to revisit
the issue may justify a dismissive response such as “Get out of my face,” which would be
disrespectful if uttered on the occasion of a first, polite inquiry or invitation to discuss the
issue. Similarly, failure to change one’s behavior is not unresponsive in this context if
the individual provides some socially appropriate explanation or reason why he or she
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does not accept the recommended change in behavior. And the notion of explanation or
reason cannot be stricter than that deployed in understanding and justifying the behavior
of the “chronically mentally healthy” adult population in similar circumstances and
ordinary conversation, on pain of treating consumers unequally and disrespectfully,
probably in consequence of stigma.
We have seen that the law intervenes in various degrees from payeeship to
conservatorship to conditional release to outpatient commitment to guardianship to
inpatient commitment. The law would do well to follow social conventions in creating
yet more mechanisms for gradually working up to a commitment by small steps.

VII. Conclusion

In 1690, John Locke, in Two Treatises of Government, recommended government
protection for “Madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right
Reason to guide themselves.” For Locke, this application of parens patriae was “no more
than Duty, which God and nature has laid on Man.”276
Since the 1960s, state mental health laws have moved away from parens patriae
as a basis for state action and moved toward the use of dangerousness as the exclusive
grounds for state intervention. This move has often been justified by claiming that it
supports the civil rights and liberty of the persons. As Frank Lanterman, one of the
sponsors of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act phrased it: The proposed legislation would
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free “thousands of persons from the ‘tyranny of help’ that has camouflaged for so many
years the denial of liberty and basic human dignity.”277
This represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the concept of liberty
and the goal of treating all individuals with severe psychiatric disorders with the
least restrictive alternative. As Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy recently
noted:

It must be remembered that for the person with severe mental illness who
has no treatment, the most dreaded of confinements can be the
imprisonment inflicted by his own mind, which shuts reality out and
subjects him to the torment of voices and images beyond our powers to
describe.278

Robert Reich observed that “freedom to be sick, helpless and isolated is
not freedom,”279 and Stephen Rachlin et al. similarly asked: “Can we really call it
‘liberty’ if someone walks the streets in terror because of paranoid delusions or
threatening hallucinations?”280
For individuals with severe psychiatric disorders, the consequences of
nontreatment can be severe. Homelessness, incarceration, and victimization are
often the daily fare. In commenting on the effects of the Lessard decision on
affected individuals, Darold Treffert put it succinctly and eloquently:

It is not “freedom” to be wandering the streets, severely mentally ill,
deteriorating and getting warmth from a steam grate or food from a
garbage can; that’s abandonment. And it is not “liberty” to be in a padded
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jail cell instead of a hospital, hallucinating and delusional, without
treatment because that is all the law will allow.281
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